Nash bargaining and leader–follower models in water allocation: Application to the Zarrinehrud River basin, Iran

Safari, Nasim; Zarghami, Mahdi; Szidarovszky, Ferenc

doi:10.1016/j.apm.2013.10.018

Cited by 57 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Therefore, the total number of followers' decision variables is 33. It is also assumed that the cultivation area for a given crop is calculated by the multiplication of the total allocated water to each sector (the leader's decision variables) by the crop's cultivation area coefficient (Safari et al, 2014). By solving the model, a Pareto front curve with various solution points is formed.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Developing a non-cooperative optimization model for water and crop area allocation based on leader-follower game

Sedghamiz

Nikoo

Heidarpour

et al. 2018

Journal of Hydrology

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In this paper, a mathematical model for conflict resolution among a diverse set of agricultural water users in Golestan province, Iran, is developed. Given the bi-level nature of the distribution of power in the current problem, a combination of Leader-Follower game and Nash-Harsanyi bargaining solution method is employed to find optimal water and crop area allocations. The Golestan Regional Water Authority is the leader in this setting, controlling the total water allocations; and the agricultural sectors are the followers, competing over the allocated water. Two objectives for the leader are (i) maximizing profits, and (ii) maximizing share of green water in total agricultural production through selecting more efficient crop patterns. The followers' objective is merely maximizing obtained benefits for the selected crop patterns. Virtual water concept is also factored into the related objective functions, and the water allocation problem is solved considering spatio-temporal crop pattern along with a dynamic water pricing system. This involves using a hybrid optimization structure as a new approach to solving two level optimization problems. The results show that the leader's income is independent of total water allocation and is only affected by crop pattern and crop area, two factors which drive water price too. The followers' benefit also depends on crop pattern and crop area, as they influence the crop yield, cost and water price. Finally, green water plays a key role in selecting the optimal crop pattern and crop area.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Developing a non-cooperative optimization model for water and crop area allocation based on leader-follower game

Sedghamiz

Nikoo

Heidarpour

et al. 2018

Journal of Hydrology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Based on the cooperative game model, Wang and Liu [ 14 ] proposed that the impact of external environment should be considered when allocating public river water resources. Safari et al [ 15 ] discussed the interest coordination among water users by building a bargaining game model. Kucukmehmetoglu [ 16 ] proposed a water resources allocation method by integrating game theory and Pareto frontier concepts.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fair and Reasonable Allocation of Trans-Boundary Water Resources Based on an Asymmetric Nash Negotiation Model from the Satisfaction Perspective: A Case Study for the Lancang–Mekong River Bain

Fang

Chen

et al. 2020

IJERPH

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The issue of trans-boundary water conflict has become an important factor affecting the relations between basin countries. The key to solve the current conflict problem is to realize the fair and reasonable allocation of trans-boundary water resources. Based on the satisfaction perspective, we developed an asymmetric Nash negotiation model to obtain an optimal and feasible allocation scheme for the trans-boundary water resources. Firstly, based on the two international water laws, we analyzed the influencing factors including water demand differences, resource endowment differences, and water efficiency differences, and by combing with the flexible weight constraint, we built the fair and reasonable allocation pattern for trans-boundary water resources. Secondly, under the constraint of the allocation pattern, we determined the ideal negotiation scheme of each basin country by considering their selection preference. Thirdly, we built a satisfaction degree function and established an asymmetric Nash negotiation model. This is used to build a fair negotiation mechanism among basin countries, and the allocation scheme after negotiation is regarded as the optimal allocation scheme. Lastly, we took the Lancang–Mekong river basin as an example. For this example, the results indicate the following: (1) after considering multiple factors comprehensively, China and Thailand obtained a higher proportion of trans-boundary water resource quota under different preference scenarios, while Myanmar obtained a lower proportion of trans-boundary water resource quota; (2) taking each basin country as the negotiation agent, the optimal allocation scheme with the introduction of fair negotiation mechanism has a higher degree of satisfaction, with an average of over 87.19%, which is more stable and easy to be accepted by all basin countries; (3) from the perspective of the change rate and the average satisfaction of the basin countries, the optimal allocation scheme under the resource endowment preference scenario obtained the highest satisfaction among basin countries. This study aims to improve the practicability and acceptability of trans-boundary water resources allocation, thus providing technical support for reducing trans-boundary water resources conflicts.

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“…Shangguan et al (2002) stated that future research should focus on inter-sector water allocation. Teams optimizing inter-sector water allocation generally used a linear production function for industry (Babel et al, 2005;Divakar et al, 2011;Safari et al, 2013). Cai et al (2006) and Reynaud (2003) stated that a production function for industry should be nonlinear.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimization of inter-sectorial water reallocation for arid-zone megacity-dominated area

Banihabib

Hosseinzadeh

Peralta

2015

Urban Water Journal

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Current water demand management of megacity-dominated areas in arid-zones should be revised to optimize water allocation for sustainable development. A novel hierarchical optimization model is proposed and examined for such an area in the arid zone of Iran. The model can significantly increase water economic efficiency, reduce unsatisfied demand, and maintain necessary agricultural production. Model sub-optimization provides the cropping pattern and transient fourphenological-stage deficit-irrigation strategy that maximizes economic benefit per unit agricultural allocation. The model employs a nonlinear benefit function for industry, a linear benefit function for service, and a cubic benefit function for deficit-irrigated agriculture. If available water is unchanged, optimal economic benefit increases 283 percent from the current situation. This requires decreasing agricultural water allocation, changing cropping patterns, using deficit irrigation, and increasing development of industrial and service sectors. If annual available water decreases by 25%, or by 40%, net economic benefit can increase 101% and 19%, respectively.

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Nash bargaining and leader–follower models in water allocation: Application to the Zarrinehrud River basin, Iran

Cited by 57 publications

References 11 publications

Developing a non-cooperative optimization model for water and crop area allocation based on leader-follower game

Developing a non-cooperative optimization model for water and crop area allocation based on leader-follower game

Fair and Reasonable Allocation of Trans-Boundary Water Resources Based on an Asymmetric Nash Negotiation Model from the Satisfaction Perspective: A Case Study for the Lancang–Mekong River Bain

Optimization of inter-sectorial water reallocation for arid-zone megacity-dominated area

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