Nash bargaining and renegotiation with social preferences: case of the roundwood log supply contracts in the French timber market

Exchange Networks with Stochastic Matching

“…The latter is obtained by assigning values to the nodes-equivalent to their weighting of the matching-such that their sum is greater than or equal to the weight of the edge. Ergo, the individual values of the edges in the matching have a maximal value on G. Provided the values of x u (t) and x v (t), coming from the expressions ( 9) and (10), and of w u,v (t), we obtain…”

“…Despite the general presumption that social preferences are ignored in settings such as competitive markets, it fails to hold when uncertainty is important ( [52]). While maintaining the previous assumption of convergent beliefs, let φ ∈ [0, 1] be the outcome share that player u keeps on the edge (u, v), so 1 − φ would be the share value that player v receives ( [10,53]). In that case,…”

“…Parallel to the exchange networks, bargaining has received great attention from the economists ( [7][8][9][10]). Nash bargaining solution, normatively satisfying axioms of rationality of players in a non-cooperative game, has been previously studied with regard to vertical markets ( [11]), international relations ( [12]), innovation partnerships ( [13]), labor relations ( [14]) and to power division among economic stakeholders ( [15]).…”