2019
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12360
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Nash equilibrium and party polarization in an electoral model with mixed motivations

Abstract: We study the existence problem of Nash equilibrium as well as the patterns of equilibrium policy outcomes in an electoral competition model with mixed motivations. Each party maximizes a sum of party members' expected utility and office rent. The inclusion of office rent renders the payoff of each party discontinuous. This makes it difficult to apply usually fixed point arguments to prove the existence of Nash equilibria. By using a recently developed concept, multiple restrictional security (MR-security) we p… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
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“…The latter depends on the relative distance of the chosen platform from the candidate's ideal policy. When cost elasticity 4 See also Takayama, Tamura, and Yeo (2019) who characterize equilibria in a political competition setup with mixed motivations.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The latter depends on the relative distance of the chosen platform from the candidate's ideal policy. When cost elasticity 4 See also Takayama, Tamura, and Yeo (2019) who characterize equilibria in a political competition setup with mixed motivations.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%