Nash Equilibrium in Macro-Task Crowdsourcing Systems With Collective-Effort-Dependent Rewarding

Xu, Minkang; Chen, Xiaojie; Szolnoki, Attila

doi:10.1109/tnse.2023.3347766

IEEE Trans. Netw. Sci. Eng.

2024

DOI: 10.1109/tnse.2023.3347766

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Nash Equilibrium in Macro-Task Crowdsourcing Systems With Collective-Effort-Dependent Rewarding

Minkang Xu,

Xiaojie Chen,

Attila Szolnoki

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Cited by 2 publications

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Evolution of cooperation under pure institutional reward and punishment in collective-risk social dilemma games

Yan,

Xu,

Liu

et al. 2024

Physics Letters A

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Evolution of cooperation under pure institutional reward and punishment in collective-risk social dilemma games

Yan,

Xu,

Liu

et al. 2024

Physics Letters A

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Exploring complex dynamics in a Stackelberg Cournot duopoly game model

Ahmed,

Khalid,

Karam

2024

Phys. Scr.

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In this study, we investigate the dynamics of a Cournot duopoly game model with bounded rational players, incorporating a leader-follower mechanism where the first player acts as a leader and the second as a follower, aware of the leader's production. We examine the existence and stability of all fixed points in the model and use center manifold and bifurcation theory to analyze the occurrence and direction of period-doubling and Neimark-Sacker bifurcations at the positive fixed point. To control bifurcation and chaos, feedback control and hybrid control methods are applied. Numerical examples are provided to confirm our theoretical results and reveal the model's complex dynamics. Our results highlight the critical role of the leader's strategic decisions, particularly the adjustment speed parameter $v_1$, in driving the system from stability to chaos, affecting both firms and leading to significant shifts in market dynamics.

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Nash Equilibrium in Macro-Task Crowdsourcing Systems With Collective-Effort-Dependent Rewarding

Cited by 2 publications

References 56 publications

Evolution of cooperation under pure institutional reward and punishment in collective-risk social dilemma games

Evolution of cooperation under pure institutional reward and punishment in collective-risk social dilemma games

Exploring complex dynamics in a Stackelberg Cournot duopoly game model

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