Nash Q-learning agents in Hotelling’s model: Reestablishing equilibrium

Research on pricing models for technology‐trading platforms with different business models: A two‐stage dynamic game model

“…Hypothesis Based on Hotelling's model and Armstrong's platform‐pricing model (Armstrong, 2006; Saur et al, 2022; Vainer & Kukacka, 2021), we propose the assumption of a duopoly environment assuming that there are two technology‐trading platforms (platform 1 and platform 2) in the market and that the platform‐pricing model will be characterized in conjunction with the transition stage from an “information‐intermediary platform model” to a “one‐stop‐service platform model”.Hypothesis According to the bilateral market theory (Wang & Fu, 2019; Wang & Guo, 2017; Zhao & Wang, 2020), there are three types of participants in the pricing model of technology‐trading platforms: the platform operator, technology provider, and technology demander, all of which are finite rational “economic men”. The platform operator provides services to providers and demanders to obtain revenue.…”

“…Hypothesis 1. Based on Hotelling's model and Armstrong's platform-pricing model (Armstrong, 2006;Saur et al, 2022;Vainer & Kukacka, 2021), we propose the assumption of a duopoly environment assuming that there are two technology-trading platforms (platform 1 and platform 2) in the market and that the platformpricing model will be characterized in conjunction with the transition stage from an "information-intermediary platform model" to a "one-stop-service platform model".…”

Supply chain ethics and transparency: An agent‐based model approach with Q‐learning agents

“…Several studies supplement this limitation with computational economics methods, such as ABMs and Q-learning algorithms (Gallay & Hongler, 2009) Q-learning agents, representative reinforcement learning agents, are incorporated into economic models (Charpentier et al, in press). Game theory studies examine how learning agents affect equilibria (Vainer & Kukacka, 2021;Xu, 2021). When a learning agent is incorporated into an oligopoly game framework, the collusion strategy dominates; thus, learning agents are mainly used in research on collusion (Calvano et al, 2020(Calvano et al, , 2021Gautier et al, 2020).…”