National Government Responses to Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) Fisheries Certification: Insights from Atlantic Canada

Abstract

Over the last decade, the proliferation of social and environmental certification programmes has attracted the attention of a growing number of political scientists interested in new forms of 'private' transnational governance. However, we still lack analyses on the nature and extent of different state responses to and involvement in new private transnational governance arrangements in particular sectors and in different jurisdictions. This paper advances our understanding of the interactions between nation-state and private transnational modes of governance by analysing the role of national government authorities in Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) fisheries certification in Atlantic Canada, known more for the disastrous collapse of Northern cod stocks than good marine stewardship. Focusing on the 2008 certification of Northern shrimp (Pandalus borealis) fisheries off the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador, the analysis finds that the implementation and maintenance of MSC certification in this case depended on significant support from government authorities. The delicate legitimacy of both authorities face a period of uncertainty in this case since some certified shrimp stocks appear to be in decline and perhaps also migrating northward off Newfoundland and Labrador.

The implementation of Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certification in Russia: Achievements and considerations

“…However, the MSC has increasingly been criticized for its focus on larger fisheries and fisheries in Europe and North America, while assessing relatively few small-scale fisheries or fisheries in the developing world [2,3]. 3 The lack of detailed empirical analyses of certification processes under a variety of social and political conditions has also been noted [4,5]. With civil society and expert structures that differ from those prevalent in North America and much of Europe, Russia falls in the under-represented category.…”

New tuna regimes

“…Building on the work of Foley (2012Foley ( , 2013, we observe that the role of the state in certification is direct rather than facilitative. This appears to be all the more important in the context of RFMOs where only member states have the right to negotiate and ratify harvest control measures and reference points.…”

“…Economic institutions then set multiple de facto incentives for state action that go beyond market pay-offs to also consider long term conservation gains. Seen as such, and building on the work of Foley (2012Foley ( , 2013, we observe that state plays a directly facilitative role in the adoption and application of certification. This appears to be all the more important in the context of RFMOs where only member states have the right to negotiate and ratify harvest control measures and reference points.…”

“…At face value economic institutions (like the MSC) are relatively simple 'price premium' market tools. But as outlined variously in this thesis, such tools offer far more in terms of promoting institutional change when strategically applied by political institutions in the design of governance institutions (see also Foley 2013, Gulbrandsen 2014, Adolf et al 2016. That is, when tied to the opportunity cost of fleets exclusion from a fishery, or the fisheries exclusion from a market, the relative cost of information provision is reduced.…”

“…Foley (2013), for example, shows how MSC instigated change by conflating the state as a client and enforcer of regulatory change. Similarly Adolf et al (2016) show how the state can reposition itself as not only a client for MSC certification, but in doing so gain greater control over value generation in international markets.…”