2012
DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2012.706412
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National Parliamentary Control of EU Affairs: Institutional Design after Enlargement

Abstract: This article analyses the differences in institutional design in national parliamentary control over European Union affairs among EU member states. It proceeds from a preference-based perspective, drawing on the principal-agent framework, and a timebased perspective, inspired by the historical institutionalist approach. The article involves a qualitative comparative analysis of strong control and a quantitative, correlation analysis of variation in the degree of control. It argues that time-based factors provi… Show more

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Cited by 62 publications
(52 citation statements)
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“…Two factors were identified as being most important: domestic institutional strength and Euroscepticism. Institutional strength has been measured with a variety of variables such as the overall institutional strength of parliaments prior to and independent of integration, the power balance in legislative-executive relations or the type of government (especially minority governments) (Bergman 1997(Bergman , 2000Dimitrakopoulos 2001;Holzhacker, 2005;Karlas 2012;Martin 2000;Maurer and Wessels 2001;Raunio 2005;Saalfeld 2005). 'Indeed, research on explaining cross-national variation in the level of scrutiny in EU matters indicates that the overall strength of the legislature "spills over" to European affairs, with stronger control of the government in domestic matters producing also tighter cabinet scrutiny in European affairs' (Raunio 2009: 330, FN 11).…”
Section: Delegation and Ownership In Times Of Crisismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Two factors were identified as being most important: domestic institutional strength and Euroscepticism. Institutional strength has been measured with a variety of variables such as the overall institutional strength of parliaments prior to and independent of integration, the power balance in legislative-executive relations or the type of government (especially minority governments) (Bergman 1997(Bergman , 2000Dimitrakopoulos 2001;Holzhacker, 2005;Karlas 2012;Martin 2000;Maurer and Wessels 2001;Raunio 2005;Saalfeld 2005). 'Indeed, research on explaining cross-national variation in the level of scrutiny in EU matters indicates that the overall strength of the legislature "spills over" to European affairs, with stronger control of the government in domestic matters producing also tighter cabinet scrutiny in European affairs' (Raunio 2009: 330, FN 11).…”
Section: Delegation and Ownership In Times Of Crisismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A number of studies have classified and ranked national parliaments according to their institutional strength in EU affairs. Although the rankings differ slightly due to a different emphasis on specific institutional provisions, the overall picture is fairly consistent: As the latest rankings by Karlas (2012), Winzen (2012) In sum, the institutional capacity of national parliaments has been significantly altered by the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty and the way in which national systems have adapted to these.…”
Section: The Domestic Institutional Contextmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…This allows all parliaments to be analysed with a single dictionary of keywords in English instead of multiple dictionaries, which avoids potential validity issues. Furthermore, the national parliaments in Ireland and the UK rank close together roughly in the middle of all other parliaments with regard to their role in EU affairs, such as controlling their governments in EU affairs (Auel, Rozenberg, & Tacea, 2015;Karlas, 2012;Winzen, 2012) or being involved in the transposition of EU directives (Sprungk, 2013). Although there is no such data at the regional level, the selection of regional parliaments from the same member state to some extent controls for possible variation in their role.…”
Section: Case Selection Data and Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%