National security and FDI policy ambiguity: A commentary

Abstract

From Germany's chipmaker Infineon's proposed takeover of US-based Wolfspeed being blocked in 2017 to China's Huawei being banned in the USA and other countries in 2020; from the UK's new National Security and Investment Bill being announced in the Queen's Speech on 19 December 2019, to the EU's FDI Screening Regulation fully entering into force on 11 October 2020, inward foreign direct investments are increasingly scrutinized by host-country governments on the grounds of national security concerns. While FDI policy and screening regimes work differently in different countries, they share something in common, that is, ambiguity and obscurity have become the key features of FDI policies for most countries when concerned with national security. Drawing on securitization and balance-of-power theories, I contend that the ambiguity in FDI policy is intentionally constructed to leave room for power struggles. I argue that ambiguity is an important prerequisite for politicians and other political and corporate actors to engage in the securitization of FDI to support their political and commercial agendas. This commentary contributes to a better understanding of the prevailing trend of ambiguity in relation to inward FDI policy, a reality that is different from what Cuervo-Cazurra (2018) advocates.https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jibp

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