National targeting policies, high-technology industries, and excessive competition

Abstract

This paper explores some fundamental changes in market dynamics that are unfolding in the new competitive landscape as a result of aggressive industrial intervention by nation'states. The thesis is that national targeting policies are likely, under identifiable conditions, to cause rivalry in high‐technology industries to become excessively competitive, strictly defined in terms of producer welfare. The paper analyzes why this is likely to occur in high‐technology sectors rather than in other types of industries, and how excessive competition is likely to be manifested in specific dimensions of competitive rivalry. The paper also discusses research opportunities for further development of a theory of the political economy of excessive competition and for strategy scholars to make new contributions to trade policy debates.

Historical pathways to a green economy: The evolution and scaling-up of solar PV in Ghana, 1980–2010

“…There are inherent motives in government policies through interventions such as taxes and subsidies to create conditions that facilitate scaling up towards a green economy (World Bank, 2008;Brahm, 1995). Governments can also create awareness and setting the policy framework and incentives can facilitate the adoption of new technologies (Tsoutsos and Stamboulis, 2005;Brahm, 1995). The financial resources and capabilities within the various branches of government can be utilised to raise awareness within the community.…”

“…First of all, government national developmental policies such as industry restructuring, domestic subsidies and tax reductions have been found to be particularly effective in attracting investors and the private sector into a particular sector of the economy in scalingup efforts (Brahm, 1995;Hughes, 1987). There are inherent motives in government policies through interventions such as taxes and subsidies to create conditions that facilitate scaling up towards a green economy (World Bank, 2008;Brahm, 1995). Governments can also create awareness and setting the policy framework and incentives can facilitate the adoption of new technologies (Tsoutsos and Stamboulis, 2005;Brahm, 1995).…”

A Contingency Theory of Internationalization

“…a contingency Perspective: the Moderating Role of trade liberalization the second key moderator of our contingency framework is that greater or lesser trade liberalization within the domestic market further amplifies or diminishes the I-P relationship for the EM MNEs. Overall, the effect of trade liberalization on firm strategy and performance has been understudied in the international strategy literature, with Brahm (1995) noting, "[s]trategic management scholars have…traditionally stayed away from research topics that require expertise (and interest) in trade theory" (Brahm 1995, p. 87). Furthermore, Brahm (1995, p. 87) urged scholars to "…generate more penetrating insights into competitive dynamics following various kinds of government intervention in high technology industries."…”

Repensando redes estratégicas

“…Dentre as dimensões invisíveis na literatura dominante de estratégia, que são visíveis para a literatura de redes baseada em economia política internacional, destacam-se as seguintes: (a) o poder político e econômico de corporações transnacionais e multinacionais junto a governos e mercados nacionais (Murtha & Lenway, 1994;Sklair, 2002); (b) o papel de políticas dos EUA para o desempenho de empresas de setores estratégicos no exterior (Brahm, 1995;Murtha & Lenway, 1994); e (c) a influência das relações entre países sobre as estratégias e desempenho de grandes corporações e das redes lideradas por essas organizações (Sklair, 2002;Ramamurti, 2001). …”