Nationalism, party political discourse and Scottish independence: comparing discursive visions of Scotland's constitutional status

Abstract

This article critically examines the predominant narratives which emanated from party political discourse in relation to the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. Utilising a methodological approach centring on political discourse analysis (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012), this paper analyses party manifestos and constitutional policy documents produced by the three largest political parties represented in the Scottish Parliament, namely, the pro-independence Scottish National Party, and two pro-union parties, Scottish Labour and the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party. The emergent discourse of each party is interrogated by drawing upon pertinent theoretical concepts from previous academic analyses of Scottish nationalism, with particular attention given to those which have deployed modernist and ethnosymbolist theoretical approaches when analysing the Scottish context. This facilitates a critical reflection on the contrasting and nuanced narratives of the Scottish nation's past and future espoused by each political party vis-à-vis modernist and ethnosymbolist theory, illustrating the ways in which contrasting theorisations of nationalism are empirically tangible within political discourse and are thus not simply theoretical abstractions.

Not now! Construction of the “now-is-not-the-time” discourse of Theresa May and Boris Johnson vis-à-vis the second Scottish independence referendum

“…This overarching scheme was reproduced in other, more concrete arguments: while Johnson overwhelmingly legitimised staying in the union by referencing economic output, which sat well with the 2014 Conservative strategy (Donnelly and Vlcek 2021 ; Whigham 2020 , p. 1230), May’s discursive construction relied, apart from economic aspects, on security considerations (for instance, May 2017b ) as a subject that, according to her, advanced the anti-independence argument. This echoed the Better Together 2014 campaign, which highlighted both economic and security considerations (Whigham 2020 , p. 1230). Moreover, just like Better Together, both PMs used a number of de-legitimating strategies to discredit their opponents, including othering (Buckledee 2018 ; Douglas 2021 ; Engström 2020 ).…”

“…Unlike 2014, the current debate is not conducted in relation to the European Union (Buckledee 2018 , p. 111) and there seems to be fewer allusions to the more-than-300-year history of the union (Moragas-Fernández and Gómez 2015 , p. 251). Moreover, in contrast to the Better Together campaign, which made direct action claims, in terms of voting No in the referendum and voting for Conservatives in the 2015 Westminster and 2016 Holyrood elections (Whigham 2020 , p. 1230), May and Johnson did this only rarely. If they rhetorically appealed to collective action, it was exclusively in the sense of negotiating a favourable Brexit deal (May) and fighting the coronavirus crisis (Johnson).…”

“…Just like pro-union figures in 2014, both PMs made a case for the union with England on the grounds of the benefits it bestows on Scotland (Donnelly and Vlcek 2021 ; Moragas-Fernández and Gómez 2015 ; Whigham 2020 ). This overarching scheme was reproduced in other, more concrete arguments: while Johnson overwhelmingly legitimised staying in the union by referencing economic output, which sat well with the 2014 Conservative strategy (Donnelly and Vlcek 2021 ; Whigham 2020 , p. 1230), May’s discursive construction relied, apart from economic aspects, on security considerations (for instance, May 2017b ) as a subject that, according to her, advanced the anti-independence argument. This echoed the Better Together 2014 campaign, which highlighted both economic and security considerations (Whigham 2020 , p. 1230).…”

“…Scotland held a vote on independence on 18 September 2014, with 55 per cent of the voters rejecting leaving the United Kingdom (UK). Yet, the issue was thrust back into the spotlight in 2016, when the UK voted to withdraw from the EU, with repeated calls for a second Scottish plebiscite growing louder ever since (Johns 2021 ; Keating 2021 ; Martill 2022 ; Paun et al 2021 ; Whigham 2020 ; Whigham et al 2021 ). As in 2014, the generally accepted (albeit not universal) position has been that Westminster’s approval is needed to put a referendum on Scottish independence beyond legal doubt (McCorkindale and McHarg 2021 ; Torrance 2021 ).…”

“…May and Johnson were, after all, the very central figures in the independence debate, since the generally accepted position is that the permission from the UK Government is required for the referendum to be legally binding (McCorkindale and McHarg 2021 ; Torrance 2021 ). What is more, both May and Johnson were the first post-referendum PMs in the UK, and both members of the Conservative Party—the traditional party of the union (Whigham 2020 , p. 1231). Both have been dubbed Brexit PMs and both operated in highly challenging contexts.…”