NATO, Britain, France and the FRG

Heuser, Béatrice

doi:10.1057/9780230377622

Cited by 57 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…After the British were compelled to buy the missile Skybolt from the Americans in 1960, some ministers, such as Minister of Defence Peter Thorneycroft and Minister of Aviation Julian Amery questioned whether Britain had nuclear independence. 13 Co-operation with France could also form part of a 'grand design' to move Britain closer to Europe or to create a European political and defence unity. As the French began developing a nuclear-weapons programme from the mid-1950s, they expressed interest in information from the United States or Britain.…”

Section: Pursuing Anglo-french Nuclear Co-operationmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘The Nuclear Myth’: Edward Heath, Europe, and the International Politics of Anglo-French Nuclear Co-Operation 1970–3

Parr¹

2013

The International History Review

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Section: Pursuing Anglo-french Nuclear Co-operationmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘The Nuclear Myth’: Edward Heath, Europe, and the International Politics of Anglo-French Nuclear Co-Operation 1970–3

Parr¹

2013

The International History Review

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“…69 For Wilson Anglo-French cooperation on nuclear weapons would be a method of alleviating some of the pressures on the UK defence budget whilst also strengthening European initiatives in conventional defence. 70 Following the decision to proceed with Chevaline, interest now lay in theatre nuclear weapons (TNWs). Joint development of TNWs was viewed as a method of facilitating closer Franco-British relations in the nuclear field.…”

Section: Chevaline's Development and Administrative Infrastructurementioning

confidence: 99%

The British Labour Government and the development of Chevaline, 1974–79

Stoddart

2010

Cold War History

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“…20 This doctrinal convergence was in large part made possible by British force reductions: with the British no longer planning on first use of several nuclear weapons, the principal scenario for nuclear use short of a full-scale strategic exchange would be similar to the longstanding French concept of a 'pre-strategic' shot, designed as a shock to force an adversary to reconsider his options. 21 As the WE-177 gravity bomb was phased out, the Trident force inherited the role of 'substrategic' use (as formalised in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review 22 ). This is technically a slightly different concept, yet in broad terms, those differences in doctrine caused by differences in the manner of threat perceived from the Soviet Union, or by differences in available hardware, had receded.…”

Section: First Steps After the Cold Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

Britain and France as Nuclear Partners

Harries

2012

Survival

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In November 2010, as part of a broad-ranging bilateral defence agreement, the United Kingdom and France signed a treaty providing for limited cooperation on nuclear weapons. Modest in scope, and the product in immediate terms of economic pressure, the nuclear treaty's main substantive provision is for the joint construction of radiographic-hydrodynamic facilities. 1 Beneath the surface of this treaty, however, lies a story of significant strategic shifts, and there are intriguing possibilities for future collaboration between the UK and France, and perhaps for trilateral cooperation involving the United States.The potential for UK-French collaboration spans the spectrum of nuclearweapons issues, from technology to policy, and perhaps to operational matters. These possibilities are sensitive, not only because they run into the everyday difficulties of political-military relations between the countries, but also for their relevance to two current debates: the ongoing battle over renewing the UK's fleet of strategic nuclear submarines, and international demands for multilateral nuclear disarmament.The impulse towards a nuclear partnership is not new: it existed to varying degrees over the course of the Cold War, most strongly at certain moments in the 1960s and 1970s; and in the 1990s the first steps were taken, at least towards consultation. However, for a number of strategic, political and technical reasons, no significant progress in this direction was made. By 2010, three things had changed.

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NATO, Britain, France and the FRG

Cited by 57 publications

References 0 publications

‘The Nuclear Myth’: Edward Heath, Europe, and the International Politics of Anglo-French Nuclear Co-Operation 1970–3

‘The Nuclear Myth’: Edward Heath, Europe, and the International Politics of Anglo-French Nuclear Co-Operation 1970–3

The British Labour Government and the development of Chevaline, 1974–79

Britain and France as Nuclear Partners

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