NATO expansion: The anatomy of a decision

Goldgeier, James

doi:10.1080/01636609809550295

Cited by 29 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…Gorbachev tested the idea of NATO membership a couple of times in a prudent manner, for instance during the German reunification talks with US Secretary of State James Baker in May 1990 (Sarotte, ). Also President Yeltsin, for instance in September 1993, made clear that Russia had an interest in joining NATO (Goldgeier, , p. 88). Even President Putin in his first term was potentially interested in ‘a broader participation’ in NATO (Lyne, , p. 4).…”

Section: Missed Opportunity In the Post‐cold War Period: Unfulfilled mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The latter included the promise by NATO not to station nuclear weapons or foreign troops on a permanent basis in the former Warsaw Pact countries. Earlier, President Clinton had promised President Yeltsin that eventually a democratic Russia could become part of NATO (in line with the neoconservative and neoliberal argumentation à la Fukuyama) and stated that in the meantime NATO expansion would not threaten Russia's interests (Goldgeier, , p. 97). The latter clearly showed a lack of understanding of how Russia perceived the situation.…”

Section: Nato Expansion and The Balkan Warsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Origins of the Ukraine Crisis and the Need for Collective Security between Russia and the West

Sauer

2016

Global Policy

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The relationship between major powers in the world determines the level of global stability. Two constellations are imaginable: balance of power and collective security. The end of major (world or cold) wars offers possibilities for change from one constellation to another. This article tries to explain the origins of the Ukraine crisis. It posits that the crisis in Ukraine is only a symptom of a wider conflict between two major powers (or power blocs), whose origins can only be understood by assessing the post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. Instead of having integrated Russia in a collective security organization on an equal level, the West kept NATO alive and by doing so deteriorated the relationship with Russia. Despite different warnings from Moscow, NATO invited Ukraine to become member, and the EU offered Trade and Association Agreement talks to Ukraine. As a result, the relationship glided back towards a classic balance of power relation with spheres of influences. To prevent similar conflicts in the future, Russia should be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Ideally, the existing collective defence organization (NATO) should be transformed into a collective security organization with the inclusion of both Russia and Ukraine. Policy Implications• The way how the 'losers' of a (cold) war are treated determines the stability in the aftermath. The international community did well after 1815 and 1945, but failed miserably after 1918. The argument of this article is that also after 1989 the West missed an opportunity to integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture (on an equal basis). The end of (cold) wars are perfect times for trying to move from one great power constellation to another (e.g. from pure balance of power to collective security).• Collective defence organizations (= alliances) are inherently unstable as they are constantly looking for an external enemy. This article argues that NATO's prolonged life after the Cold War is not normal, and contributed to the crisis with Russia (by extending NATO to the East, incl. plans to include Georgia and Ukraine). Collective security organizations (like the UN) are more stable.

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Section: Missed Opportunity In the Post‐cold War Period: Unfulfilled mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Nato Expansion and The Balkan Warsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Origins of the Ukraine Crisis and the Need for Collective Security between Russia and the West

Sauer

2016

Global Policy

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“…For example, Waltz (2000a) observes that America's championing of NATO expansion is also explained by the Clinton's failures in Bosnia: "With the administration's Bosnian policy in trouble, Clinton needed to show himself to be an effective leader in foreign policy" (p. 30). Such vision is also reinforced by Goldgeier (1998) who reminds that "Clinton needed to demonstrate US leadership. His administration's foreign policy in Bosnia was failing miserably, and this failure overshadowed every other foreign policy issue at that time" (pp.…”

Section: Clinton's Foreign Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

The US and NATO Expansion: Fulfilling a Domestic Political Agenda

Ranise

2019

RPCP - PJPS

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Resumo A expansão da NATO tem sido, certamente, um tema bastante controverso que continua a dividir o mundo em apoiantes e oponentes. Várias razões têm sido apresentadas para justificar a decisão de alargamento da NATO, nomeadamente a securitização e estabilização da Europa, a democratização dos países anteriormente sob a alçada soviética ou o reforço da eficácia e coesão da Aliança. Embora todas essas propostas possam ser válidas, este artigo quer analisar se, como tem sido afirmado por diversos intervenientes, a decisão dos EUA de ampliar a NATO, respondeu em primeiro lugar, às considerações de realpolitik. Quer-se investigar, se é verdade que o alargamento abordou preocupações de política doméstica específica dos EUA, que tiveram a sua expressão também em iniciativas de política externa e, mais especificamente, se o presidente Clinton usou o alargamento da NATO para aumentar as suas probabilidades de reeleição. O estudo realizado demonstra que foi realmente assim e que, o presidente Clinton não poderia ter seguido uma política diferente. Sem o compromisso firme dos EUA de expandir a NATO, o alargamento da Aliança provavelmente nunca teria ocorrido.

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“…118 Clinton told Lake that he was impressed with their vehemence, and supported enlargement from that moment. 119 Clinton was open to these appeals, because they ªtted with the drive to expand market democracy and modernize alliances.…”

Section: How the Blob Prevented Changementioning

confidence: 99%

Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment

Porter

2018

International Security

110

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Why has U.S. grand strategy persisted since the end of the Cold War? Despite shocks such as the 2008 global financial crisis and the costs of the war in Iraq—circumstances that ought to have stimulated at least a revision—the United States remains committed to a grand strategy of “primacy.” It strives for military preponderance, dominance in key regions, the containment and reassurance of allies, nuclear counterproliferation, and the economic “Open Door.” The habitual ideas of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, or the “Blob,” make U.S. grand strategy hard to change. The United States' military and economic capabilities enable the U.S. government to pursue primacy, but the embedded assumptions of the Blob make primacy the seemingly natural choice. Thanks to the Blob's constraining power, alternative grand strategies based on restraint and retrenchment are hardly entertained, and debate is narrowed mostly into questions of execution and implementation. Two cases—the presidency of Bill Clinton and the first year of the presidency of Donald Trump—demonstrate this argument. In each case, candidates promising change were elected in fluid conditions that we would expect to stimulate a reevaluation of the United States' commitments. In each case, the Blob asserted itself successfully, at least on the grand strategic fundamentals. Change in grand strategy is possible, but it would require shocks large enough to shake the assumptions of the status quo and a president willing to be an agent of change and prepared to absorb the political costs of overhauling Washington's traditional design.

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NATO expansion: The anatomy of a decision

Cited by 29 publications

References 1 publication

The Origins of the Ukraine Crisis and the Need for Collective Security between Russia and the West

The Origins of the Ukraine Crisis and the Need for Collective Security between Russia and the West

The US and NATO Expansion: Fulfilling a Domestic Political Agenda

Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment

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