“…This in turn raises the question of whether their main security interests lie inside or outside the US=Europe=Russian triangle. 46 In the Middle East these policies entail the following objectives:…”
Section: Foreign Observers Confirm These Conclusion For Example Thmentioning
Russia has made systematic strategic efforts for the last few years to expand and enhance its strategic presence throughout the Middle East. It has used all the instruments of power available to it-arms sales, energy sales or buys, and diplomatic support-to gain a lasting position from which it can influence all of the states and issues in the Middle East while remaining unconstrained in its behavior. In other words, it seeks a position from which it can influence or obstruct events but not have any responsibility for arranging true peace settlements of a lasting nature. Indeed, even its attitude toward terrorists is of a strictly utilitarian nature. Hence, its Middle Eastern policies are ultimately and essentially negative and obstructive and cannot bring about a lasting settlement anywhere.
“…This in turn raises the question of whether their main security interests lie inside or outside the US=Europe=Russian triangle. 46 In the Middle East these policies entail the following objectives:…”
Section: Foreign Observers Confirm These Conclusion For Example Thmentioning
Russia has made systematic strategic efforts for the last few years to expand and enhance its strategic presence throughout the Middle East. It has used all the instruments of power available to it-arms sales, energy sales or buys, and diplomatic support-to gain a lasting position from which it can influence all of the states and issues in the Middle East while remaining unconstrained in its behavior. In other words, it seeks a position from which it can influence or obstruct events but not have any responsibility for arranging true peace settlements of a lasting nature. Indeed, even its attitude toward terrorists is of a strictly utilitarian nature. Hence, its Middle Eastern policies are ultimately and essentially negative and obstructive and cannot bring about a lasting settlement anywhere.
“…As Thomas Gomart (, 132) noted,the lack of interest in the operational dimension of events in Chechnya is often accompanied by a reading of Russian arms sales that is often incomplete. Russia has three main clients, which cannot but be of interest to the (NATO) Alliance: India, China, and Iran, with which it officially maintains civilian nuclear cooperation.…”
The study of a country's arms sales opens up pathways for investigating its domestic and foreign policies. Arms sales are also a phenomenon that is greatly affected by globalization. This is certainly the case for Russia, especially as regards its arms sales to Asia. This article analyzes Russian arms sales to Asia and finds that despite Moscow's professed optimism that it can continue to maintain a competitive edge and its standing as a key Asian military power, there are many reasons for serious concern. These concerns relate to the quality of Russian weapons, to the domestic struggle for resources within a thoroughly corrupt defense industrial sector, and to external forces such as Chinese and South Korean producers who now compete with Russia in the global and Asian arms markets. Such trends may lead not only to a decline in Russia's overall standing and capabilities in Asia, but also to a transformation of Asia's strategic landscape.
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