Different conceptions of "health" and "illness" underlie medicalizing or critical perspectives in the field of mental health. In this essay, I analyze naturalistic (Boorse, Szasz) and normativist (Engelhardt Jr., Fulford, Goosens, Margolis) conceptions of health and mental disorder, pointing out the limits of these conceptions. From a critical approach to the "hybrid" theories (which point to the fundamental psychobiological materiality of disorders while maintaining that socially constructed evaluative judgments underlie every statement about "illness"), I argue that the status of disorder given to a set of symptoms is always entangled in a social, cultural and political dimension, and is not a "natural fact", even though it is metaphysically dependent on psychobiological processes. This metaphysical dependence is not only consistent with a biopsychosocial model, but also better adheres to the research data, while allowing for a normative or social constructionist dimension that is consistent with emancipatory projects.