Natural Selection Does Care about Truth

Boudry, Maarten; Vlerick, Michael

doi:10.1080/02698595.2014.915651

Cited by 21 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…For example, Branden Fitelson and Elliott Sober () have argued that his probability arguments are vague and would require more specific probabilities. Others have argued that evolution actually does care about truth (Law ; Wilkins and Griffiths ; Boudry and Vlerick ), because every organism needs to be able to navigate its environment in a reasonably reliable manner: organisms need a representation of the world that is accurate enough for survival and reproduction. Systematically wrong beliefs would thus be mostly selected against according to evolutionary theory.…”

Section: Criticism Of Eaanmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Critics of Plantinga's argument also note that although our cognitive faculties are indeed fallible and can sometimes give rise to false beliefs, Plantinga presents too strong a dichotomy, making either all of our beliefs or none of them reliable (Boudry and Vlerick ). In fact, it has long been known that our cognitive faculties are sometimes prone to biases (Nickerson ; Schacter, Guerin, and St. Jacques ; Wilson and French ), but these biases can only be detected against a background of accurate and reliable belief formation.…”

Section: Criticism Of Eaanmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Biblical and Theistic Arguments Against the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

Nieminen¹,

Boudry²,

Ryökäs³

et al. 2017

Zygon

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Alvin Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism states that evolution cannot produce warranted beliefs. In contrast, according to Plantinga, Christian theism provides (I) properly functioning cognitive faculties in (II) an appropriate cognitive environment, in accordance with (III) a design plan aimed at producing true beliefs. But does theism fulfill criteria I-III? Judging from the Bible, God employs deceit in his relations with humanity, rendering our cognitive functions unreliable (I). Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that God's purpose would be to produce true beliefs in humans (III). Finally, from the theistic/religious perspective, it is impossible to tell whether observations have natural or supernatural causes, which undermines an appropriate cognitive environment (II). Reliable identification of deceit or miracles could alleviate these problems, but the theistic community has failed to resolve this issue. Dismissal of parts of the Bible, or attempts to find alternative interpretations, would collapse into skepticism or deism. Thus, Plantinga's problem of epistemic warrant backfires on theism.

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Section: Criticism Of Eaanmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Criticism Of Eaanmentioning

confidence: 99%

Biblical and Theistic Arguments Against the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

Nieminen¹,

Boudry²,

Ryökäs³

et al. 2017

Zygon

Self Cite

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“…5 Not all areas of discourse are threatened by evolutionary considerations. For example, the truth of our beliefs about ordinary objects is consistent with their purported evolutionary background (Wilkins and Griffiths 2013;Boudry and Vlerick 2014).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Old Wine in New Bottles

Klenk

2017

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) purport to show that robust moral realism, the metaethical view that there are non-natural and mind-independent moral properties and facts that we can know about, is incompatible with evolutionary explanations of morality. One of the most prominent evolutionary debunking arguments is advanced by Sharon Street, who argues that if moral realism were true, then objective moral knowledge is unlikely because realist moral properties are evolutionary irrelevant and moral beliefs about those properties would not be selected for. However, no evolutionary, causal explanation plays an essential role in reaching the argument's epistemological conclusion. Street's argument depends on the BenacerrafField challenge, which is the challenge to explain the reliability of our moral beliefs about causally inert moral properties. The Benacerraf-Field challenge relies on metaphysically necessary facts about realist moral properties, rather than on contingent Darwinian facts about the origin of our moral beliefs. Attempting to include an essential causal empirical premise yet avoiding recourse to the Benacerraf-Field problem yields an argument that is either self-defeating or of limited scope. Ultimately, evolutionary, causal explanations of our moral beliefs and their consequences do not present the strongest case against robust moral realism. Rather, the question is whether knowledge of casually-inert, mind-intendent properties is plausible at all.

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“…A growing number of naturalists, however, have put up a strong case against evolutionary sceptical worries (Fales ; McKay and Dennett ; Law ; Wilkins and Griffiths ; Boudry and Vlerick ). They have forcefully argued that evolutionary considerations are not at odds with epistemic reliability.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind? (Darwin 1881) Wilkins and Griffiths 2012; Boudry and Vlerick 2014). They have forcefully argued that evolutionary considerations are not at odds with epistemic reliability.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution and Epistemic Justification

Vlerick¹,

Broadbent²

2015

Dialectica

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According to the evolutionary sceptic, the fact that our cognitive faculties evolved radically undermines their reliability. A number of evolutionary epistemologists have sought to refute this kind of scepticism. This paper accepts the success of these attempts, yet argues that refuting the evolutionary sceptic is not enough to put any particular domain of beliefs -notably scientific beliefs, which include belief in Darwinian evolution -on a firm footing. The paper thus sets out to contribute to this positive justificatory project, underdeveloped in the literature. In contrast to a 'wholesale' approach, attempting to secure justification for all of our beliefs on the grounds that our belief-forming mechanisms evolved to track truth, we propose a 'piecemeal' approach of assessing the reliability of particular belief-forming mechanisms in particular domains. This stands in contrast to the more familiar attempt to transfer warrant obtained for one domain (e.g., common-sense beliefs) to another (e.g., scientific beliefs) by showing how one is somehow an extension of the other. We offer a naturalist reply to the charge of circularity by appealing to reliabilist work on the problem of induction, notably Peter Lipton's distinction between self-certifying and non-self-certifying inductive arguments. We show how, for scientific beliefs, a non-self-certifying argument might be made for the reliability of our cognitive faculties in that domain. We call this strategy Humean Bootstrapping.

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Natural Selection Does Care about Truth

Cited by 21 publications

References 22 publications

Biblical and Theistic Arguments Against the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

Biblical and Theistic Arguments Against the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

Old Wine in New Bottles

Evolution and Epistemic Justification

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