2021
DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2021.1949556
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Naturalised modal epistemology and quasi-realism

Abstract: Given quasi-realism, the claim is that any attempt to naturalise modal epistemology would leave out absolute necessity. The reason, according to Simon Blackburn, is that we cannot offer an empirical psychological explanation for why we take any truth to be absolutely necessary, lest we lose any right to regard it as absolutely necessary. In this article, I argue that not only can we offer such an explanation, but also that the explanation will not come with a forfeiture of the involved necessity. Using "squari… Show more

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