Nature and consequences of halo error: A critical analysis.

Abstract

The definition of halo error that dominated researchers' thinking for most of this century implied that (a) halo error was common; (b) it was a rater error, with true and illusory components; (c) it led to inflated correlations among rating dimensions and was due to the influence of a general evaluation on specific judgments; and (d) it had negative consequences and should be avoided or removed. We review research showing that all of the major elements of this conception of halo are either wrong or problematic. Because of unresolved confounds of true and illusory halo and the often unclear consequences of halo errors, we suggest a moratorium on the use of halo indices as dependent measures in applied research. We suggest specific directions for future research on halo that take into account the context in which judgments are formed and ratings are obtained and that more clearly distinguish between actual halo errors and the apparent halo effect. When an individual is rated on multiple performance dimensions or attributes, the rater's overall impression or evaluation is thought to strongly influence ratings of specific attributes (Cooper, 1981 b), a phenomenon that is referred to as halo error (Thorndike, 1920). Discussions of halo error are most frequently encountered in the context of evaluative judgment (e.g., in interviews and performance appraisals), but similar phenomena have been noted in research on illusory correlation (Chapman & Chapman, 1969), implicit personality theory (Lay & Jackson, 1969), and interpersonal judgments (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Research on halo errors in rating can be traced back to the early part of this century (Thorndike, 1920; Wells, 1907). Although there are a number of different conceptual and operational definitions of halo (Balzer & Sulsky, 1992; Saal, Downey, & Lahey, 1980), throughout most of the history of research on halo error, there has been some consensus regarding the nature and consequences of halo error. First, halo error is thought to be common (

Getting Rid of Performance Ratings: Genius or Folly? A Debate

“…Earlier, we noted that one popular form or training instructed raters not to make halo errors, not to be lenient, and so forth. It is not clear that removing halo, leniency, and the like makes g e t t i ng r i d of pe r f or m a nc e r at i ng s performance ratings better measures of performance, and it is even plausible that efforts to suppress these so-called errors make performance ratings worse (Murphy, 1982;Murphy, Jako, & Anhalt, 1993). Borman (1977) argued that under some circumstances, it might be possible to assess the accuracy of performance ratings.…”

“…Other rater errors, including leniency or severity and range restriction, were soon identified. There is a substantial research literature that analyzes rater error measures, particularly measures of halo (Balzer & Sulsky, 1992;Cooper, 1981aCooper, , 1981bMurphy, 1982;Murphy & Anhalt, 1992;Murphy & Balzer, 1989;Murphy, Jako, & Anhalt, 1993;Nathan & Tippins, 1989;Pulakos, Schmitt, & Ostroff, 1986). On the whole, rater error measures are deeply flawed criteria.…”

Auditors' Judgment Errors When Working on Multiple Tasks and in Multiple Client Environments: A Research Summary and Practice Implications

“…Based on this risk assessment, auditors plan and execute audit procedures. However, research in psychology and on performance evaluations has demonstrated that evaluative judgments based on holistic characteristics can create a halo effect that influences subsequent judgments about detailed performance measures, even when the holistic judgment is not related to the evaluation of the detailed metrics (Nisbett and Wilson 1977;Murphy et al 1993). For example, research has shown that rendering a favorable holistic evaluation can cause an individual to provide a positive assessment for information related to detailed performance measures, even when the detailed performance measures may convey less than positive information (Finucane et al 2000).…”

External Sourcing of Core Technologies and the Architectural Dependency of Teams

“…Recent research in psychology has contributed to reducing the concern about this so-called "halo effect" (Balzer and Sulsky, 1992;Murphy et al 1993). Nevertheless, if there is agreement among team members that a given project was a failure, it is reasonable to argue that there is a risk that the retrospective account of how the project unfolded will be colored by this view.…”