Nature of AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in Relation to Peace Building Strategies in Somalia

Abstract

With the collapse of the central government, Somalia was engulfed into a predatory violence from the warlords. It saw deaths and acute humanitarian crisis amidst the vulnerable population. In nearly over two decades, peace still remains a dream in the failed state. The efforts to restore peace and stabilize the nation have proved to be futile. The weak Federal Government of Somalia struggles to run the state from the comforts of Mogadishu since most parts are still under the control of Al shabaab and other clan militias. Even in the capital mortar shells fired by the militants can be heard regularly. Suicide bombers pose a major threat to Mogadishu and other high value targets within the town. The researchers targeted AMISOM personnel and locals. The primary data was collected through interviews and questionnaires. Secondary data was gathered and reviewed from journals, books, magazines, newspapers and published proceedings that corroborated the primary data. The study found out that the nature of AMISOM needs to be realigned to facilitate the peace building efforts. The study recommends that operations should major on winning the hearts and minds of the locals which is vital in fighting asymmetrical warfare; and the mandate should not be changed frequently. The findings generated a body of knowledge that informs designing of peace support operation practices, processes and strategies for ensuring durable and sustainable peace in Somalia and elsewhere.

African Union Mission in Somalia Considerations for Transition and Kenya’s National Security

“…These findings are corroborated with studies by Ligawa (2018) and Kagwanja et al (2020) which advanced that AMISOM has liberated large swathes of territory under Al-Shabaab's control, including capturing the strategic port city of Kismayu, Marka, and control of Mogadishu. In addition, and with regards to success of AMISOM, the findings of this study are corroborated with which established that piracy along the Indian Ocean has been vanquished, thus saving Kenya's tourism sector and the economy.…”

“…Moreover, it resonates well with the submission by Onditi (2015) which argued that PSO structures should adapt to the realities of African conflicts, which require efforts beyond traditional military approaches. In addition, it gives credence to the argument by Ligawa (2018), that cultural intelligence alongside military approaches should be blended for optimal AMISOM peacebuilding outcomes. The sectoring strategy by AMISOM aligned to Nzau's (2018) analysis of contingent deployment to reflect the national interests by each TCC.…”

“…Over the years, AMISOM's mandate strategies would evolve from protecting the Somali authorities and facilitating a political process to warfighting, counter-insurgency, and stabilization with state-building admixture. To execute its responsibilities, the AU and UN altered the character and nature of the mission to enable the attainment of the Mission tasks between 2007 and 2011 (Ligawa, 2018). From the confines of Mogadishu, the mission expanded to other regions when contingents from Kenya and Djibouti joined those from Uganda and Burundi.…”

“…After the fall of Siaad Barre's regime in 1991, the UN attempted to stabilise the situation in Somalia to provide security for humanitarian aid, which activities of warlords such as Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed had hitherto hampered. The result was the deployment of UNOSOM I in 1993, then UNITAF in 1994, which shortly transitioned into UNOSOM II, which eventually exited in 1995 (Ligawa, 2018;Nzau, 2018). The infamous 1993…”

The Failure of Peacebuilding in Somalia: The 'Myth' of the Nation-State

“…There was a total of fourteen attempts at creating a functioning transitional government. 36 These transitional governments came under criticism for not being inclusive enough amongst other things.…”