Naval Modernization in Southeast Asia: Under the Shadow of Army Dominance?

Abstract

Using a historical institutionalist approach, this article addresses the future of Southeast Asia's naval forces. Much analysis on this subject employs a linear Realist model in which Southeast Asia's navies are expected to be the beneficiaries of declining internal security challenges and a deteriorating external threat environment. However, to date neither of these factors, including increasing Chinese assertiveness in the maritime domain, appear to have significantly accelerated naval force development in Southeast Asia. While there have been some capability increases in areas such as submarines, growth has mainly been in patrol boat and fast attack craft classes. Numbers of larger offshore surface combatants like frigates have fallen. This article argues that in countries where army dominance has become institutionalized, and civil control of the military is weak, governments may be unwilling or unable to reallocate funding away from armies to maritime forces. In a funding environment in which national economic growth is moderate, and spending on defence is a lower priority, naval modernization and expansion can be blocked. This article examines the cases of Thailand, Indonesia and Myanmar to demonstrate how their armies became dominant and how this may have diminished the growth prospects of their navies.

Strategic Culture and Indonesian Maritime Security

“…The blurred distinction between 'defence' or sovereignty protection against external threats and 'security' against internal threats has undermined the agenda to shift the TNI-AL's focus to its traditional military roles. This institutionalised culture seen, for instance, in the dominance of the Army explains why the increasingly demanding strategic environment has not yet been seen as a powerful imperative for naval expansion in Indonesia (Raymond 2017). And as noted by Longhurst, strategic culture 'arise gradually over time, through unique protracted historical process … is persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its original conception' (Longhurst 2000).…”

“…Indeed, as one scholar notes, the TNI-AL strategy is essentially defensive in a sense that it does not adhere to the Mahanian concept of command of the sea, nor does it attempt to project naval assets beyond Indonesian waters (Supriyanto 2011). The institutionalised land force dominance has also hindered the ambition to expand Indonesian naval power (Raymond 2017).…”

Kerjasama Pengembangan Medium Battle Tank Harimau Sebagai Perwujudan Ketahanan Alutsista Tentara Nasional Indonesia

“…Penelitian terdahulu juga ada yang membahas mengenai pengaruh politik domestik dalam penentuan pembelian atau pengadaan senjata Indonesia. Penelitian dalam kategori ini menggunakan perspektif historical institusionalism (Raymond, 2017). Penelitian tersebut menyatakan bahwa pembelian senjata di angkatan laut yang secara kuantitatif tidak sebanding dengan kebutuhan dipengaruhi oleh kondisi domestik Indonesia.…”