Near-Winners in Status Competitions: Neglected Sources of Dynamism in the Matthew Effect

Abstract

Current research on status hierarchy dynamics focuses on the potential for and constraints to individual mobility. In this essay, I argue that Merton's Matthew Effect incorrectly categorizes activity below a status threshold as linear. This mis-specification calls into question existing models of competitions for social status. I argue for an improved theory of status tournaments as asymmetric, non-binary, and agentic. Through that new perspective, I raise questions for the legitimacy and power of stratifying institutions.

The risk of being ranked: Investor response to marginal inclusion on the 100 Best Corporate Citizens list

“…As our results suggest, these categorical comparisons may be detrimental for lower ranked firms by enhancing the salience of the performance disparity with higher ranked firms. We see this counterintuitive finding as providing further evidence of the limits and potential downsides of status (Azoulay et al, 2014;Graffin, Bundy, Porac, Wade, & Quinn, 2013;Reschke et al, 2018) and as further motivation to study the implications of competition near status boundaries (Otner, 2018;Piezunka et al, 2018).…”

Systems of Evaluation and the Matthew Effect

“…These cursory comparisons cannot tell us anything conclusive about the Matthew Effect, but they do highlight some potentially fruitful directions of inquiry. First, these comparisons raise questions about how the characteristics of the system of judgment matter for the carrying out of the Matthew Effect (see also Otner, 2018a, b). One hypothesis is that the Matthew Effect is most likely to be activated and most likely to act powerfully when there is a single, dominant mode of judgment, like the Nobel Prize or the USN ranking of law schools.…”

“…In this prerankings world, the Matthew Effect was muted by a lack of agreement about how schools compared with each other. Without formal judgments not only could nearly every accredited law school make a reasonable claim to Merton’s 41st Chair (see Otner, 2018b), but many schools could also convincingly make claims to being in—if only in the lower echelon of—the elite, legal education’s analogue to the French Academy (Merton, 1968). While schools that were clearly among the elite did receive unequal rewards, the ambiguity in the assessment of reputation allowed schools to construct their own claims about quality.…”

The Matthew Effect as an Unjust Competitive Advantage: Implications for Competition Near Status Boundaries

“…Merton’s attention to (social) space constraints in the elite status grade also suggests that, just beneath it, status positions are highly crowded (Bothner, Kang, & Stuart, 2007). In fact, if the top of any status hierarchy is to keep its allure, there must be a large crowd of aspirants ever-seeking entry from a 41st chair (Otner, 2018b). The sustainability of the elite status grade, where the Matthew Effect is thought to operate most freely, requires continuous entry-attempts, followed by frequent, status-reinforcing rejections (cf.…”