Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: Implementability versus security

Peace through bribing

“…The results show that compared to Zheng (2019b), even though off the path player 1 can propose different bribes and for each of them player 2 employs different replies for different beliefs, the peace conditions are closely related to the boundary types and the boundary beliefs. One interesting corollary is that peace is not weakly securable if the type supports of both players share the same upper bound and in particular if the two players' type distributions are symmetric.…”

“…Furthermore, if an equilibrium survives the D1 criterion (Cho and Sobel (1990)), it is said to be robust. On the other hand, different from Zheng (2019b), there are two kinds of notions of peace security in our model. If there exists a peaceful bribe such that for all possible belief systems, no types of player 1 find it profitable to deviate to any other bribes and no types of player 2 find it profitable to reject the peaceful bribe, then we say that peace is weakly securable.…”

“…In our model there can be various degrees of peace prospects and we adopt the similar ones from Zheng (2019b). If in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (hereafter, equilibrium) the on-path bribes are accepted by all types of player 2, then we say that the equilibrium is peaceful.…”

“…A brief review of related literature is given for the rest of this section. In section 2 we describe the model and introduce some results from Zheng (2019b) for all-pay auctions. In section 3 we first characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for peace implementability and weak security.…”

Patent auctions and bidding coalitions: structuring the sale of club goods

“…Also, in the coalition-formation game, we allow any number of coalitions to arise endogenously. 13 Other contributions include Zheng (2019b), Chen and Tauman (2006) and Kivetz and Tauman (2010). Earlier work by Brusco and Lopomo (2002) considers a setting in which bidders coordinate during the course of an ascendingprice auction on the allocation of multiple objects among them.…”