Need, justice and central–local relations: The case of social assistance in China

Abstract

Social assistance is increasingly promoted as a means of tackling poverty. However, in established democracies stable delivery has often proved difficult because of tensions between national and local government, the former desiring comprehensiveness and uniformity, the latter requiring flexibility to meet local needs. These issues are explored in the context of China and Dibao, the world's largest social assistance system, with three questions posed: Do similar tensions exist in China as in the Western world? How are they resolved and what is the nature of the political compromise? How do recipients fare? Policy analysis in a village in south‐central China reveals similar tensions. A regime in which local government employed discretion to prioritize social stability over poverty alleviation has been replaced by an inherently unstable system based on surveillance of officials and local cadres who now prioritize their personal security over the needs of applicants.

Putting the international in Public Administration: An International Quarterly. A historical review of 1992–2022

“…Peeters et al (2020) uncovered citizens' “gaming” response to dissatisfaction with public service in Cancún, Mexico. In Asia, M. Li and Walker (2021) offers a case study of China's social assistance system. In fact, as part of our analysis, we also examined the geographic representation of Public Administration authors with forthcoming manuscripts (see Figure 2).…”

Gender Dynamics and Social Assistance in Chinese Villages

“…This problem is exacerbated by the need for national policy to be delivered locally. Hence, the history of social assistance provision is one of oft-repeated struggles between central government, keen to ensure standardized implementation and territorial justice through regulation, and local government wishing to apply discretion to meet localized needs (Li and Walker 2020). Incentive structures to encourage compliance by local government is more likely to be effective than heavily policed formal dictates.…”

“…However, these have only been partially successful. In much of Shanxi province, dibao is still largely implemented as an old age and disability pension Li and Walker 2020).…”

Decentralized governance and collective action dilemma: Sub‐national governments' responses to COVID‐19 in China

“…The third, in contrast, argues that the seemingly decentralized practices of local governance masked the contentious political process brewing within the central government, which has sat at the core position in shaping the extent and scope of delegation to local authorities all along (Cai & Treisman, 2006;Lam, 2010). Finally, the fourth strand contends that the central-local relations in China feature an intertwining synthesis of a political centralization of cadre appointment and decentralization of the local policy adoption and implementation (Landry, 2008;Li & Walker, 2021;Mertha, 2005), and thus should be understood in a context of co-agency of central and local actors (Li, 2010). The COVID-19 outbreak and the responses of governments at different levels to the epidemic have unveiled a unique opportunity for reassessing the debates on central-local relations.…”