I develop and defend a truthmaker semantics for the relevant logic R. The approach begins with a simple philosophical idea and develops it in various directions, so as to build a technically adequate relevant semantics. The central philosophical idea is that truths are true in virtue of specific states. Developing the idea formally results in a semantics on which truthmakers are relevant to what they make true. A very natural notion of conditionality is added, giving us relevant implication. I then investigate ways to add conjunction, disjunction, and negation; and I discuss how to justify contraposition and excluded middle within a truthmaker semantics. truthmaker semantics be developed for a whole system of relevant logic? I argue that it can. I focus on the most well-known relevant logic, R (set out in Appendix A). My strategy is to argue, on philosophical grounds, for a number of principles governing truthmaker semantics and to show that, taken together, these give a sound and complete formal semantics for R.My approach first adopts a notion of conditionality (Section 3), to which I then add conjunction (Section 4), disjunction (Section 5), and negation (Section 6). I then discuss how to accommodate the stronger principles of contraposition (Section 7) and excluded middle (Section 8). The technical appendices set out R (Appendix A), the formal semantics and its key properties (Appendix B), and proofs of soundness and completeness (Appendix C). Throughout, I shall focus on developing the truthmaker approach and discussing the philosophical issues it raises, rather than discussing alternative semantics or their philosophical interpretations.By way of further motivating the approach, I begin (Section 2) with a puzzle, relating relevance, conditionality, and validity. I then argue (Section 3) that the truthmaker approach provides a very elegant solution.