Negative affect does not impact semantic retrieval failure monitoring.

Jersakova, Radka; Souchay, Céline; Allen, Richard J.

doi:10.1037/cep0000065

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Studies that induced changes in arousal through subliminal affective priming (Allen et al, 2016) and pharmacological manipulation (Hauser et al, 2017) suggested that arousal responses may reduce the tendency to adjust metacognitive judgements according to internal or external noise, although they disagreed on which aspect of metacognition (sensitivity or bias) was most affected. Additionally, some studies have reported that negatively-valenced material increased measures of confidence in perception (Koizumi, Mobbs, & Lau, 2016) and in subsequent recall (Schwartz, 2010, Zimmerman and Kelley, 2010), while others found no effect of negative valence on metacognition (D'Angelo and Humphreys, 2012, Jersakova et al, 2015). Though these studies offer mixed evidence on the relations between arousal, affect, and metacognition, they suggest that the negatively valenced and arousing qualities of nociceptive pain could alter the calibration of metacognitive judgements, perhaps yielding over-confidence in perceptual decisions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Metacognition across sensory modalities: Vision, warmth, and nociceptive pain

et al. 2019

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The distinctive experience of pain, beyond mere processing of nociceptive inputs, is much debated in psychology and neuroscience. One aspect of perceptual experience is captured by metacognition—the ability to monitor and evaluate one’s own mental processes. We investigated confidence in judgements about nociceptive pain (i.e. pain that arises from the activation of nociceptors by a noxious stimulus) to determine whether metacognitive processes contribute to the distinctiveness of the pain experience. Our participants made intensity judgements about noxious heat, innocuous warmth, and visual contrast (first-order, perceptual decisions) and rated their confidence in those judgements (second-order, metacognitive decisions). First-order task performance between modalities was balanced using adaptive staircase procedures. For each modality, we quantified metacognitive efficiency (meta-d’/d’)—the degree to which participants’ confidence reports were informed by the same evidence that contributed to their perceptual judgements—and metacognitive bias (mean confidence)—the participant’s tendency to report higher or lower confidence overall. We found no overall differences in metacognitive efficiency or mean confidence between modalities. Mean confidence ratings were highly correlated between all three tasks, reflecting stable inter-individual variability in metacognitive bias. However, metacognitive efficiency for pain varied independently of metacognitive efficiency for warmth and visual perception. That is, those participants who had higher metacognitive efficiency in the visual task also tended to have higher metacognitive efficiency in the warmth task, but not necessarily in the pain task. We thus suggest that some distinctive and idiosyncratic aspects of the pain experience may stem from additional variability at a metacognitive level. We further speculate that this additional variability may arise from the affective or arousal aspects of pain.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Metacognition across sensory modalities: Vision, warmth, and nociceptive pain

et al. 2019

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“…These word-finding failures do not necessarily include the ToT state’s sense of closeness to retrieving the target word, which likely results from the achievement of partial phonological access (A. S. Brown, 1991; Jersakova, Souchay, & Allen, 2015). Thus, we hypothesize that the ToT experience does not precisely map onto the anomic experiences we describe here, but lies in between IwW and sIS at the level of partial phonological access.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Subjective experience of inner speech in aphasia: Preliminary behavioral relationships and neural correlates

et al. 2017

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Many individuals with aphasia describe anomia with comments like “I know it but I can’t say it.” The exact meaning of such phrases is unclear. We hypothesize that at least two discrete experiences exist: the sense of (1) knowing a concept, but failing to find the right word, and (2) saying the correct word internally but not aloud (successful inner speech, sIS). We propose that sIS reflects successful lexical access; subsequent overt anomia indicates post-lexical output deficits. In this pilot study, we probed the subjective experience of anomia in 37 persons with aphasia. Self-reported sIS related to aphasia severity and phonological output deficits. In multivariate lesion-symptom mapping, sIS was associated with dorsal stream lesions, particularly in ventral sensorimotor cortex. These preliminary results suggest that people with aphasia can often provide meaningful insights about their experience of anomia and that reports of sIS relate to specific lesion locations and language deficits.

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Negative affect does not impact semantic retrieval failure monitoring.

Cited by 2 publications

References 56 publications

Metacognition across sensory modalities: Vision, warmth, and nociceptive pain

Metacognition across sensory modalities: Vision, warmth, and nociceptive pain

Subjective experience of inner speech in aphasia: Preliminary behavioral relationships and neural correlates

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