Neglected and Unloved: Does the Hinge Party Deserve That?

Abstract

This article focuses on the hinge party both as a concept and a strategy. It seeks to ‘liberate’ the hinge party from the clutches of such close conceptual relatives as the ‘pivot party’, the ‘genuine pivot party’, the ‘pivotal centre party’, the ‘pivotal middle party’ and the ‘pivotal median party’. This is a taxonomical jungle and while some use the terms ‘hinge party’ and ‘pivot party’ interchangeably, this study urges a ‘velvet divorce’. The main theoretical question is in two parts: (1) What are the distinguishing features of the hinge party and how does it differ from the pivot party?; and (2) What set of legislative party system circumstances would seem most likely to favour a hinge party strategy of keeping options open to both left and right? Self‐styled centrist parties would seem most likely to favour a hinge party strategy and the empirical question is: To what extent have the Nordic Centre‐label [former agrarian] parties sought and been able to do so?

Is disloyalty rewarded? The electoral consequences of bloc changes of Scandinavian Centre Parties 1977–2019

“…The Centre Party in Finland took a somewhat similar role that has been labelled as a 'hinge party' that deliberately places itself between the leftist and rightist camp to maximise its 'availability' in the coalition building process. (Arter, 1979(Arter, , 2016. Thus, a hinge party strategy may be more attainable for major and pivotal centrist parties.…”

“…The capability to change blocs is a feature of a centre party but it may also send mixed signals to the voters, particularly if these care about which bloc should win an election. Arter (2016) hypothesised that bloc changes or changes from a bloc affiliation to a hinge party strategy are electorally costly for centre parties. Empirically, we do however know little about the electoral effects of such bloc changes for Scandinavian centre parties.…”

“…One distinctive feature of Scandinavian centre parties is their frequent pivotal position for government formation (Arter, 2016; Strøm, 1990). To strengthen their bargaining position, and for political, tactical, or long‐term strategic reasons, centre parties do sometimes shift their bloc affiliation during an election term or a campaign.…”

“…Yet, the smaller centrist parties of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark may still utilise the advantage of holding a pivotal position within the party system. This presupposes a capacity to shift side, or bloc, from left to right or vice versa, to maximise policy influence (Arter, 2016; see Rémy 1975; or Bolleyer, 2007; for bargaining power of pivotal parties and bloc changes). This motivation was given by the Social Liberal Party in Denmark when it shifted from the left to the right in 1982 and back to the left in 1993.…”

“…Such bloc shifts can be an attempt to attract new voter groups or secure policy gains, but also blur the party's profile and make voters cynical (cf. Arter, 2016; Duverger, 1964).…”