Negotiated Shareholder Value: The German Version of an Anglo-American Practice

Vitols, Sigurt

doi:10.2139/ssrn.510062

Cited by 24 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…For example, many recent studies of Germany have shown that the country has undergone major institutional change; in a sense, German fi rms have experienced an Anglo-Saxonization. Over-all, Germany remains a CME, but the German "model" is now very different from what it was in the past (Beyer / Höpner 2003;Deeg 2005aDeeg , 2005bJackson 2005c;Vitols 2004).…”

Section: Capitalism As Confi Gurations: Domains Dimensions and Typomentioning

confidence: 99%

How Many Varieties of Capitalism? Comparing the Comparative Institutional Analyses of Capitalist Diversity

2006

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MPIfG Discussion Papers are refereed scholarly papers of the kind that are publishable in a peer-reviewed disciplinary journal. Their objective is to contribute to the cumulative improvement of theoretical knowledge. The papers can be ordered from the institute for a small fee (hard copies) or downloaded free of charge (PDF). AbstractThis essay reviews the development of approaches within the comparative capitalisms (CC) literature and points to three theoretical innovations which, taken together, defi ne and distinguish these approaches as a group. First, national economies are characterized by distinct institutional confi gurations that generate a particular systemic "logic" of economic action. Second, the CC literature suggests a theory of comparative institutional advantage in which different institutional arrangements have distinct strengths and weaknesses for different kinds of economic activity. Third, the literature has been interpreted to imply a theory of institutional path dependence. Behind these unifying characteristics of the literature, however, lie a variety of analytical frameworks and typologies of capitalism. This paper reviews and compares these different frameworks by highlighting the fundamental distinctions among them and drawing out their respective contributions and limitations in explaining economic performance and institutional dynamics. The paper concludes that the way forward for this literature lies in developing a more dynamic view of individual institutions, the linkages between domains, and the role of politics and power.

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Section: Capitalism As Confi Gurations: Domains Dimensions and Typomentioning

confidence: 99%

How Many Varieties of Capitalism? Comparing the Comparative Institutional Analyses of Capitalist Diversity

2006

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“…Here firms benefit from high coordination across different domains, including employment relations, and develop strong capabilities based on their human assets and relational linkages to other firms. However, a literature on hybrid forms of corporate governance suggests that increasing pressures from capital markets may lead stakeholder-oriented firms to take bolder and faster adjustments to changes in technology and product markets (Vitols, 2002(Vitols, , 2004. For example, Aoki (2010) argues that external monitoring of internal linkages of corporate organization may be beneficial in giving corporate insiders important signals about their overall business strategy and help benchmark their efforts against competitors.…”

Section: Voc and Comparative Advantagementioning

confidence: 99%

Varieties of Capitalism and institutional comparative advantage: A test and reinterpretation

2016

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How do national-level institutions relate to national comparative advantages? We seek to shed light on this question by exploring two different sets of hypotheses based on the Varieties of Capitalism and other branches of comparative capitalisms literature. Applying fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis to data from 14 industries in 22 countries across 9 years, we find that comparative advantages in industries with radical innovation emerge in specific configurations mixing coordinated and liberal institutional features. Institutional comparative advantage in industries with radical innovation may thus be based on the ''beneficial constraints'' of opposing institutional logics rather than on the self-reinforcing institutional coherence envisioned in much of the Varieties of Capitalism literature. By contrast, we find that coordinated market economies may have comparative advantages in industries with incremental innovation, as envisioned in the Varieties of Capitalism literature. Our article contributes to our understanding of the ''so what?'' related to capitalist diversity and its implications for location decisions of multinational enterprises. We further present a coordination index going beyond Hall and Gingerich (Br J Polit Sci 39:449-482, 2009) with annual values for 22 OECD

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“…etwa Jürgens/naumann/Rupp 2000;Klages 2006). Auf betrieblicher ebene entstehe allenfalls ein Modell des "verhandelten Shareholder Value" (Vitols 2003), denn die einführung von Shareholder Value-Maßnahmen (wie beispielsweise Aktienoptionsprogrammen) müsse nun in einer um institutionelle Investoren erweiterten Stakeholder-Koalition aus beschäftigten, großaktionären, Zulieferern und Kunden verhandelt werden.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Mechanisms of Institutional Change in German Capitalism

Lütz

Eberle

2008

BJfS

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Zusammenfassung:In der debatte um die Annäherung des Rheinischen Kapitalismus an das angelsächsische Modell setzt sich zunehmend die Auffassung durch, dass eine entwicklung hybrider Institutionensysteme zu beobachten sei, die elemente beider Systeme miteinander kombinieren. Anhand einer vergleichenden Analyse der Transformation zweier Felder der deutschen Corporate governance-Regulierung - der internen unternehmenskontrolle und der Rechnungslegung - werden die Mechanismen und Antriebskräfte herausgearbeitet, die zu unterschiedlichen graden der Annäherung an angelsächsische Vorbilder geführt haben. Kam es in der internen Corporate governance lediglich zur Kopplung bestehender Strukturen mit angelsächsischen elementen ("layering"), so erfolgte in der Rechnungslegung eine Substitution alter Institutionen und Standards durch neue ("displacement"). es wird argumentiert, dass der variierende grad an Konvergenz zu erklären ist durch den in beiden Fällen unterschiedlichen exogenen Reformdruck und die differierenden Präferenzen nationaler Schlüsselakteure wie unternehmen und gewerkschaften. die Studie zeigt die bedeutung einer auf die Mesoebene gerichteten Analyse von Kausalmechanismen für die erklärung institutionellen Wandels im modernen Kapitalismus.Schlüsselwörter: Institutioneller · Wandel · Varieties of Capitalism · Regulierung · unternehmenskontrolle · Rechnungslegung Abstract: In the debate on the convergence of Rhenish capitalism towards the Anglo-Saxon model there is a growing consensus on the emergence of hybrid institutional configurations which combine elements of both systems. Our paper traces the mechanisms and driving forces leading to varying degrees of convergence with Anglo-Saxon standards and institutions by comparing the changes in two areas of german corporate governance regulation, namely internal corporate governance and accounting. Whereas existing institutions were coupled with Anglo-Saxon elements in the case of internal corporate governance ("layering"), traditional standards and institutions were substituted for new ones in the case of accounting ("displacement"). We argue that bJS 18 (2008) 4:575-595 576 S. lütz und d. eberle the varying degree of convergence can be explained by the different preferences of key national actors, such as companies and trade unions, in the two cases and the varying exogenous pressures for reforms. Our study highlights the importance of a meso-level analysis of causal mechanisms for the explanation of institutional change in modern capitalism. Les mécanismes du changement institutionnel au sein du capitalisme allemand Le bouleversement des règles de la gouvernance des entreprisesRésumé: dans le débat sur la convergence du capitalisme rhénan vers le modèle anglo-saxon, on constate le développement de systèmes d'institutions hybrides combinant des éléments des deux systèmes. Prenant l'exemple d'une analyse comparative de la transformation de deux domaines de régulation de la gouvernance des entreprises en Allemagne - le contrôle interne et la comptabilité -nous met...

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Negotiated Shareholder Value: The German Version of an Anglo-American Practice

Cited by 24 publications

References 25 publications

How Many Varieties of Capitalism? Comparing the Comparative Institutional Analyses of Capitalist Diversity

How Many Varieties of Capitalism? Comparing the Comparative Institutional Analyses of Capitalist Diversity

Varieties of Capitalism and institutional comparative advantage: A test and reinterpretation

Mechanisms of Institutional Change in German Capitalism

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