Negotiated Third Party Access—An Industrial Organisation Perspective

Growitsch, Christian; Wein, Thomas

doi:10.1007/s10657-005-1735-0

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…It is unclear whether the changes are representative for the sector. Growitsch & Wein [2004] calculate a reduction of the spread in network charges among various operators as a result of the introduction of the self-regulation in VV II+ 15 . This suggests that the increases by some are levelled out by decreases by others.…”

Section: Past Present and Futurementioning

confidence: 99%

Energy Policy and Investment in the German Power Market

Brunekreeft

Bauknecht

2006

Electricity Market Reform

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The authors study the investment incentives of energy policy in Germany and how this affects competition, the environment and supply adequacy. First, after a long period of 'self-regulation', the new Energy Act of 2005 installs a regulator and network regulation. Second, Germany has a strong agenda for the environment. Furthermore, the CO 2 emission trading scheme has significant effects. Third, despite international debate, Germany does not have an explicit policy on generation adequacy. The key conclusions are threefold. The initial position of Germany to refrain from regulating network access did not work satisfactorily. The recent creation of regulation can be welcomed and expected to stimulate competition and generation investment. As elsewhere, CO 2 permits are allocated free-of-charge, both for existing and new plants. This may be inefficient, but promotes new investment and thus benefits competition and generation adequacy. The data suggests that new generation investment will be required, but also that the market is active. Apart from wind and CHP, coal seems to have a brighter future than sometimes thought. 1 The authors would like to thank Paul Joskow, Wolfgang Pfaffenberger and Perry Sioshansi for useful comments and remarks.

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Section: Past Present and Futurementioning

confidence: 99%

Energy Policy and Investment in the German Power Market

Brunekreeft

Bauknecht

2006

Electricity Market Reform

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“…In other words, if a high-priced network is not able to justify the high level it will find itself in the spotlights of the Cartel Office. Growitsch & Wein (2004) observe that this reduced the spread in network charges.…”

Section: Cost-based or Price-based Regulation?mentioning

confidence: 84%

Regulation, Competition and Investment in the German Electricity Market: RegTP or REGTP*

Brunekreeft¹,

Twelemann²

2005

The Energy Journal

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The German energy industries will be subjected to regulation of network access enforced by a sector-specific regulator. Whereas the gas industry broke the regime of negotiated third party access, in electricity nTPA 'worked', although it clearly resulted in a margin squeeze. The government currently discusses whether to use rate-of-return or incentive regulation, to allow ex-ante approval of charges, and the length of the regulatory lag. Close examination suggests that generation capacity still is adequate, but in the longer term there is reason to be alert. The regulatory changes and emission trading system can both contribute to retain supply security by increasing investment.

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“…Retail margins were also low and the author's recommendation is that the regulator should control access prices in order to increase competition. Growitsch and Wein (2005b) found that at the low voltage level, access charges set by vertically integrated firms were lower than the ones set by independent suppliers. However, companies are obliged to give details of the access charges they apply, and according to the authors, the consequences have been tacit collusions.…”

Section: Suppliers and Creditorsmentioning

confidence: 94%

Deregulation and the stakeholder model

Jansson

2010

Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society

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Purpose -The aim of this paper is to analyze how deregulation affects different stakeholder groups, such as customers, employees, suppliers, creditors, the community and the environment. A distinction has been made between industries with and without network structures.Design/methodology/approach -The approach is based on literature review in order to formulate propositions.Findings -Deregulation has not always benefited the stakeholder groups analyzed. Consumers and employees have been able to profited from new entries, but the effect on prices and wages, respectively, is not always conclusive. Suppliers can increase their negotiating power, but on the other hand, creditors might find it difficult to get loans repaid. Deregulation in itself does not affect the environment, nor the ethical behavior of the firm.Originality/value -This study provides an insight on how deregulation affects different stakeholder groups. The regulator can benefit from the findings in order to improve the methods of deregulation. Particularly, deregulation of industries with network structures, such as electricity, natural gas, telecommunications give rise to some specific problems pointed out in the study, which the regulator ought to take into account. Consequences in other industries are also mentioned, which can help the regulator avoid errors made in the past.

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Negotiated Third Party Access—An Industrial Organisation Perspective

Cited by 7 publications

References 14 publications

Energy Policy and Investment in the German Power Market

Energy Policy and Investment in the German Power Market

Regulation, Competition and Investment in the German Electricity Market: RegTP or REGTP*

Deregulation and the stakeholder model

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