Negotiating with Terrorists: The Costs of Compliance

Abstract

It is often argued that negotiating with terrorists will encourage terrorist attacks. To date, corroborating empirical evidence is scarce. Using ITERATE data, we investigate the impact of conceding to terrorist demands on terror activity. We restrict attention to hostage events with clear‐cut demands from terrorists. Our sample period runs from 1978 to 2005 and comprises 1435 events in 125 countries. Estimating a flexible and dynamic Structured Additive Regression model, we find that the percentage of successfully negotiated events has a nonlinear effect on future terror intensity consistent with our simple theoretical model. More specifically, although moderate rates of negotiation increase the number of future terror events, higher negotiation rates tend to have the opposite effect. The estimated threshold is around 20%.

Introducing Transnational Terrorist Hostage Event (TTHE) Data Set, 1978 to 2018

“…Terrorist hostage data can also be used to evaluate the effectiveness of a noconcession policy as a means to limit future hostage incidents (Arin et al 2019;Brandt, George, and Sandler 2016;Poe 1988). That policy is predicated on the notion that if the terrorists believe the government's pledge not to grant any concessions, then there is little reason for terrorists to abduct hostages (Lapan and Sandler 1988;Selten 1977).…”

“…Brandt, George, and Sandler (2016) only supply a couple hostage variables, but they are aggregated and not in raw form. Arin et al (2019), Lee (2013), andSaygili (2019) provide only a few pre-2006 ITERATE hostage variables for replication purposes.…”

“…Even though hostage-taking attacks are the least used terrorist operation, hostage abductions are still employed when the calculus justifies them (Enders and Sandler 2012). The study of hostage incidents allows for tests of bargaining theory (Atkinson, Sandler, and Tschirhart 1987), the determinants of logistical and negotiation success (Gaibulloev and Sandler 2009;Santifort and Sandler 2013), an analysis of terrorist reputation building (Scott 1991), an evaluation of no-concession pledges (Arin et al 2019;Brandt, George, and Sandler 2016;Brandt and Sandler 2009;Lapan and Sandler 1988;Poe 1988;Saygili 2019;Selten 1977), a study of the effectiveness of hostage-taking countermeasures (Landes 1978), and an investigation of hostage takers' behavioral choices (Wilson 2000).…”

Situational Predictors of Negotiation and Violence in Hostage and Barricade Incidents

“…A minority involve tactical interventions that end in the deaths of subjects (e.g., Donohue & Taylor, 2003;Wesselius & DeSarno, 1983). And some resolve after violence is committed by subjects, in which hostages, barricade victims, law enforcement officers, or bystanders are killed (e.g., Arin et al, 2019;Phillips, 2015). Among other factors, the very diversity and complexity of crisis incidents pose a challenge for researchers and practitioners who seek to understand the best ways to respond to these situations (Faure, 2003;Heppenstall & Hammond, 2018).…”