1990
DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.515
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Negotiation behavior and outcomes: Empirical evidence and theoretical issues.

Abstract: This article examines the ability of the individual differences, motivational, and cognitive ap-

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Cited by 557 publications
(467 citation statements)
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References 111 publications
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“…In Studies 1 and 2, we used monetary incentives to induce an egoistic or a prosocial motivation (Beersma & De Dreu, 2002). As Thompson (1990) pointed out, manipulations of this kind may contain unintended hints about the variable-sum structure of the task. To rule out this alternative explanation, Study 3 manipulated prosocial and egoistic motivation by means of different cover stories.…”
Section: Methods and Proceduresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In Studies 1 and 2, we used monetary incentives to induce an egoistic or a prosocial motivation (Beersma & De Dreu, 2002). As Thompson (1990) pointed out, manipulations of this kind may contain unintended hints about the variable-sum structure of the task. To rule out this alternative explanation, Study 3 manipulated prosocial and egoistic motivation by means of different cover stories.…”
Section: Methods and Proceduresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indeed, this frame has been found to characterize negotiators in a number of empirical studies (see Thompson, 1990), suggesting that the nature of blame and the question of whether compromise is possible are of central importance in construing conflicts.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One of the most important advances in conflict and negotiation research in the past 2 decades has been the identification of judgment biases that can ultimately inhibit negotiation agreements (Bazerman & Carroll, 1987;Thompson, 1990). Much research, for example, has illustrated that negotiators tend to have fixed-pie perceptions of negotiations (Thompson & Hastie, 1990), fail to recognize compatible interests (Thompson & Hrebec, 1996), devalue concessions made by their counterparts (Stillenger, Epelbaum, Keltner, & Ross, 1991), experience less satisfaction when their counterparts are happy than when disappointed (Thompson, Valley, & Kramer, 1995), and become stuck in impasse because of self-serving biases and overconfidence (Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997;Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%