Negotiation in legislatures over government formation

“…This is not true empirically, a finding first published over 40 years ago. 6 Nonetheless, GL itself has proved extraordinarily robust to replication, even when different cabinet portfolios are assigned very 4 (Bassi 2013;Carroll and Cox 2007a;Laver et al 2011;Warwick and Druckman 2006;Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason 2013) 5 Browne and Franklin 1973;Browne and Frendreis 1980;Fréchette et al 2005b;Gamson 1961;Laver et al 2011;Schofield and Laver 1985;Warwick and Druckman 2006;Snyder et al 2005) different empirical weights. 7 On the other side of the paradox we find canonical alternating offers models of legislative bargaining, with an intellectual pedigree traceable to Rubinstein (1982), adapted to legislative bargaining by Baron and Ferejohn (1989 .…”

Section: The Paradoxmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…21 In other words, existing empirical work has modeled portfolio distribution ex post, conditional on government formation and regardless of whether the government that formed was predicted by any model. From a theoretical perspective, 19 Bassi 2013 20 (Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason 2013) 21 Snyder et al 2005;Warwick and Druckman 2006;Laver et al 2011;Carroll and Cox 2007b;Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason 2013) Cabinet formation and portfolio distribution in European multi-party systems / 9…”

Section: A Joint a Priori Model Of Government Formation And Portfoliomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…13 (Laver et al 2011) 14 (Golder 2010) (p8) 15 Snyder et al, 2005;Warwick and Druckman 2006 16 Laver et al, 2011 17 (Carroll and Cox 2007a) p 301.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The second proposition is stated ex post, knowing the identity of the formateur. The propositions are therefore not contradictory because they apply in 7 Browne and Franklin 1973;Browne and Frendreis 1980;Fréchette et al 2005b;Gamson 1961;Laver et al 2011;Schofield and Laver 1985;Warwick and Druckman 2006;Snyder et al 2005) 8 Snyder et al 2005) 9 (Snyder et al 2005: 982) 10 (Snyder et al 2005: 992) different settings, but this highlights a critical distinction between ex ante and ex post models of cabinet portfolio distribution. The paradox is therefore both simple and striking.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Cabinet Formation and Portfolio Distribution in European Multiparty Systems

Cutler¹,

Marchi²,

Gallop³

et al. 2014

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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Government formation in multiparty systems is of self-evident substantive importance, and the subject of an enormous theoretical literature. Empirical evaluations of models of government formation tend to separate government formation per se, from the distribution of key government payoffs such as cabinet portfolios between members of the government that forms. Models of government formation are necessarily specified ex ante, absent any knowledge of the government that forms. Models of the distribution of cabinet portfolios are typically, though not necessarily, specified ex post, given knowledge of the identity of some government "formateur" or even of the full partisan composition of the eventual cabinet. This disjunction lies at the heart of a notorious contradiction between predictions of the distribution of cabinet portfolios made by canonical models of legislative bargaining, and the robust empirical regularity of proportional portfolio allocations -"Gamson's Law". We resolve this contradiction by specifying and estimating a joint model of cabinet formation and portfolio distribution, which for example predicts ex ante which parties will receive zero portfolios rather than taking this as given ex post.We conclude that canonical models of legislative bargaining do add to our ability to predict government membership, but that portfolio distribution between government members conforms robustly to a proportionality norm … we suggest because portfolio distribution follows the much more difficult process of policy bargaining in the typical government formation process.Cabinet formation and portfolio distribution in European multi-party systems / 2

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Government Formation and Cabinets

Golder

2015

Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences

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The government in a parliamentary (or semi-presidential) democracy refers to the prime minister and the other cabinet ministers, whereas the government in a presidential democracy refers to the president's cabinet. The members of the government cabinet determine national policy and arguably hold the most important political positions in their country. Most governments comprise two or more parties, which means that the government formation process requires coalition-building. During this process, party elites bargain over who gets which ministerial position and over policy; they can reach an agreement quickly and take office, or the bargaining can break down and take months to resolve. This essay discusses the different types of governments that can form as well as how they form in parliamentary, semi-presidential, and presidential regimes. Recent research on government formation and cabinets has introduced new theoretical arguments, and the implications of these arguments are being tested with new data and new statistical methods. For example, analyses of European democracies now include the post-communist Eastern countries (not only the Western ones), and more scholars are studying coalition governments in Latin America. Future research might include more work on cabinets in developing democracies in regions such as Africa and Asia, as well as analyses of the political and economic consequences of bargaining delays and the partisan composition of the government.

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Negotiation in legislatures over government formation

Abstract: Bargaining, Gamson’s law, Game theory, Social choice theory, Coalition formation, Formateur,

Cited by 48 publications

References 27 publications

Proportional Payoffs in Legislative Bargaining with Weighted Voting: A Characterization

Proportional Payoffs in Legislative Bargaining with Weighted Voting: A Characterization

Cabinet Formation and Portfolio Distribution in European Multiparty Systems

Government Formation and Cabinets

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