Neither complements nor substitutes: Examining the case for coalignment of contract-based and relation-based alliance governance mechanisms in coopetition contexts

Rai, Rajnish; Surana, Mitul

doi:10.1016/j.lrp.2022.102199

Cited by 7 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 112 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Third, our study enhances the understanding of the nature and boundary of the interplay between relational mechanisms and formal contracts. In extant literature, whether and when relational mechanisms and formal contracts complement or substitute with each other still remain ambiguous (Carson et al ., 2006; Liu et al ., 2009; Rai and Surana, 2022). Consistent with Poppo and Zenger (2002), we find that these two governance mechanisms complement with each other.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(2021) find that the interplay between different governance mechanisms evolves with alliance disruption and adjustment. Rai and Surana (2022) argue that the interplay neither complements nor substitutes but should fit the coopetition context. In this sense, it is interesting and valuable to examine whether informal institutional environments (e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Other studies suggest that relational mechanisms are the critical factor over formal contracts, especially in the eastern culture influenced mostly by collectivism, such as in China (Child et al ., 2003; Qian et al ., 2013; Zhou et al ., 2003). Still, some studies have begun to investigate the comparative effects of these two governance mechanisms (Arranz and de Arroyabe, 2012; Keller et al ., 2021; Rai and Surana, 2022). Despite these illuminating studies, however, we still don't fully understand which mechanism is superior to the other when fostering alliance success, especially in different contexts.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Carson et al ., 2006; Li et al ., 2010). Recent studies further suggest that the interplay between these mechanisms will change with contextual factors (Keller et al ., 2021; Rai and Surana, 2022). For instance, Keller et al .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Comparative effects of relational mechanisms and formal contracts on alliance success

Li,

Wang,

Che

et al. 2023

BJM

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

PurposeThe research is aimed at investigating how relational mechanisms and formal contracts affect alliance success under constructive and destructive conflict.Design/methodology/approachWhile relational mechanisms and formal contracts are widely used in strategic alliances to manage a variety of issues among partners, recent research has indicated that effects of these governance mechanisms may change in distinct contexts. Adopting the lens of new institutional economics, this study provides insights on the comparative and interactive effects of relational mechanisms and formal contracts on alliance success, and the differential contingency effects of two types of inter-partner conflict, i.e. constructive and destructive conflict, on the above relationships. The authors use hierarchical multivariate regression analyses through a survey dataset of 392 alliance firms in China with the approach of two key informants.FindingsThe empirical results confirm that relational mechanisms have a stronger positive effect on alliance success than formal contracts and these two governance mechanisms complement each other in driving alliance success. When facing a high level of constructive conflict, partner firms rely to a greater extent on relational mechanisms than on formal contracts to achieve alliance success. When a high level of destructive conflict exists, partner firms depend more heavily on formal contracts than on relational mechanisms to achieve alliance success. Moreover, the complementary effect of the two governance mechanisms is much stronger when partner firms face high constructive conflict than when they face high destructive conflict.Originality/valueThis study discloses the comparative and interactive effects of relational mechanisms and formal contracts on alliance success in distinct contexts by identifying the moderating roles of constructive and destructive conflict.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Comparative effects of relational mechanisms and formal contracts on alliance success

Li,

Wang,

Che

et al. 2023

BJM

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In response, the other party will also defend itself against the violation of the cooperative party by strengthening its contractual control means and reducing knowledge exchange and sharing, which will further worsen the relationship governance and lead the cooperative members into a vicious cycle of mutual suspicion and revenge [68,69]. Therefore, the excessive use of the contractual control mechanism will indicate and trigger a sense of mistrust among the partners, which can easily harm the existing trust and further inhibit knowledge exchange and cooperative innovation among the members [12,70,71].…”

Section: Interaction Between Contractual Control and Relationship Gov...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Substitution or Complementarity: Influence of Industry–University–Research-Institute Cooperation Governance Mechanism on Knowledge Transfer—An Empirical Analysis from China

Wan

Lan

2022

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

China’s economic growth is transforming from being traditional and factor-driven to being innovation-driven. How to improve the independent innovation ability and build the sustainable competitiveness of enterprises through knowledge transfer in industry–university–research-institute (IUR) cooperation has become an urgent problem to be solved. The obstacles to knowledge transfer in an IUR cooperation include internal and external cooperation risk factors. Improving the governance mechanism of an IUR cooperation, reducing cooperation risks, and promoting knowledge transfer are effective means for overcoming such obstacles in the short term. Interorganizational governance mechanisms include contractual governance and relationship governance. Obvious differences exist in the target functions of the different types of governance mechanisms, and their effects on knowledge transfer also differ. Based on a questionnaire survey on the IUR cooperation innovation of 364 enterprises, this study discusses the impact of the contractual governance mechanism and relationship governance mechanism on knowledge transfer in the IUR cooperation. Different types of contractual governance mechanisms have different effects on knowledge transfer. The contractual coordination mechanism significantly promotes explicit knowledge transfer in an IUR cooperation but has no significant impact on tacit knowledge transfer, whereas the contractual control mechanism significantly promotes explicit knowledge transfer but hinders tacit knowledge transfer. Meanwhile, the relationship governance mechanism has a significant positive impact on explicit knowledge transfer and tacit knowledge transfer. The joint use of the contractual coordination mechanism and relationship governance mechanism can significantly promote explicit knowledge transfer and tacit knowledge transfer, whereas the joint use of the contractual control mechanism and relationship governance mechanism can significantly weaken the two types of knowledge transfer. This study provides not only a theoretical explanation for the dispute over the “complementarity” or “substitution” relationship between the contractual governance mechanism and relationship governance mechanism in knowledge transfer in an IUR cooperation, thereby enriching relationship governance theory and knowledge management theory, but also a reference to the government, enterprises, and universities/scientific institutions participating in an IUR cooperation.

show abstract

The evolution of contractual and relational governance mechanisms when platforms are actors in networks

Ratajczak-Mrozek,

Hauke-Lopes,

Harrison

2024

Industrial Marketing Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Neither complements nor substitutes: Examining the case for coalignment of contract-based and relation-based alliance governance mechanisms in coopetition contexts

Cited by 7 publications

References 112 publications

Comparative effects of relational mechanisms and formal contracts on alliance success

Comparative effects of relational mechanisms and formal contracts on alliance success

Substitution or Complementarity: Influence of Industry–University–Research-Institute Cooperation Governance Mechanism on Knowledge Transfer—An Empirical Analysis from China

The evolution of contractual and relational governance mechanisms when platforms are actors in networks

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About