“…In fact, the evidence suggests that despite partial successes, the state of affairs is not as promising as it looks at first glance in the developing world. Among many issues that block the emergence of successful developmental states, such as difficulties in forging broad coalitions among actors (Doner and Schneider 2016), local business opposition to national projects (Vivek Chibber 2003), capital's structural class power in neoliberal globalization (Masondo 2018), common problems associated with embedded autonomy and bureaucratic coordination (Kutlay and Karaoğuz 2018), and external conditions (Rodrik 2012;Wade 2018, p. 537-539), one is particularly crucial, and has begun to be studied systematically by developmental state scholars: policy-makers, incentives, and good institutions. The key question is this: when do policymakers are genuinely motivated to pursue a painful, time-consuming, but effective agenda rather than a short-term oriented, populist, but a politically attractive one?…”