Neo‐patrimonialism and Corruption: Evidence from 8,436 Firms in 17 Countries in Sub‐Saharan Africa

Abstract

This article introduces four innovations to the literature on administrative corruption. First, it employs a neo‐patrimonialism framework by addressing measurement, identification, and endogeneity issues that beset the literature. Second, unlike cross‐country studies, it uses firms as the unit of analysis. Third, unlike the conventional literature, the article uses large‐n (n = 8,436) panel survey data of key informants in 17 countries in sub‐Saharan Africa. Finally, unlike the conventional literature, the article focuses on a particular type of corruption: the supply and demand for bribery. The authors find that the uncertainty associated with neo‐patrimonialism has a strong, positive, and significant effect on the propensity of civil servants to demand bribes in exchange for services and for firms to supply bribes in exchange for winning government contracts. The results are robust to controls on the characteristics of firms and their regulatory environments. The article concludes with implications for research and practice.

Relationality

“…So, is the relational frame of analysis something that is more applicable to some contexts than others -for example, neo-patrimonial states (Araral et al, 2019)? Without completely answering this question, we might venture a qualified "yes and no."…”

Fiscal Slack, Rule Constraints, and Government Corruption

“…Silitonga et al (2019) find that “the perceived likelihood of a hypothetical civil servant accepting a bribe is lowest when monitoring and sanctioning are strong and when leaders and peers are known to have refused bribes in the past.” (Silitonga et al 2019, 565). In addition, Araral et al (2019) employ an organizational‐level perspective and derive data from the World Bank's surveys of 8,436 firms in 17 sub‐Saharan African countries. Araral et al (2019, 581) contend that “uncertainty in the careers of bureaucrats, their low salaries, high discretion, and weak monitoring and accountability…will motivate them to demand bribes and to make hay while the sun shines.” The results show that uncertainty, which is a critical feature of neopatrimonialism, positively affects the probability of civil servants demanding bribes and of firms supplying bribes (Araral et al 2019).…”

“…(Silitonga et al 2019, 565). In addition, Araral et al (2019) employ an organizational-level perspective and derive data from the World Bank's surveys of 8,436 firms in 17 sub-Saharan African countries. Araral et al (2019, 581) contend that "uncertainty in the careers of bureaucrats, their low salaries, high discretion, and weak monitoring and accountability…will motivate them to demand bribes and to make hay while the sun shines."…”

Introduction to PAR Symposium of Understanding and Reducing Public Corruption

“…Three articles in the symposium pay close attention to the propensity of individuals to engage in corruption, with Ni and Su () focusing on ordinary citizens, Zhang et al () on low‐level public employees, and Silitonga et al () on senior‐level civil servants. Araral et al’s () article also explains the proclivity for corruption at the micro level, but they use firms as the units of analysis. The remaining two articles shift the focus toward local governments.…”

“… 5. Araral et al (): “Neopatrimonialism and Corruption: Evidence from 8,436 Firms in 17 Countries in Sub‐Saharan Africa”…”