Neoclassical politics: public choice and political understanding

Dearlove, John

doi:10.1080/09538258900000016

Cited by 14 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…However, at present a strong presumption must be made for the old institutionalism. I say this, not only because of the absence of empirical support for many of the standard public choice positions [Dearlove, 1989], but because the new institutionalism has failed in any case to carry out its eliminative project of deleting references to institutions within its explanans. Reference to institutional contexts is smuggled in at the level of its assumptions about individuals' conceptions of their interests.…”

Section: Institutional Economics: the Old And The Newmentioning

confidence: 98%

Public choice, institutional economics, environmental goods

O’Neill

1995

Environmental Politics

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Section: Institutional Economics: the Old And The Newmentioning

confidence: 98%

Public choice, institutional economics, environmental goods

O’Neill

1995

Environmental Politics

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“…However, at present a strong presumption must be made for the classical institutionalism. I say this, not simply because of the absence of empirical support for many of the standard public choice claims (see Dearlove 1989), but because the new institutionalist programme has not been carried out. Its eliminative project of deleting references to institutions within its explanans has not been realised.…”

mentioning

confidence: 88%

Preferences, Virtues, and Institutions

O’Neill¹

1994

Analyse &Amp; Kritik

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Public choice theory presents itself as a new institutional economics that rectifies the failure of the neo-classical tradition to treat the institutional dimension of economics. It offers criticism of both neo-classical defenders of cost-benefit analysis and their environmental critics. Both assume the existence of benign political actors. While sharing some of its scepticism about this assumption, this paper argues that the public choice perspective is flawed. The old institutionalism of classical economics provides a better perspective to examine both explanatory and nonnative problems occasioned by environmental problems than does the new institutionalism, raising significant questions about the relationship between environmental goods, virtues and institutions which have been lost to recent discussion.

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“…The model of calculative market behaviour is transferred also to the domain of policy-making itself. Planning becomes mere 'politics' -a market for realizing interests of policy-makers or administrators themselves (Buchanan, 1978;Dearlove, 1989;Niskanen, 1971).…”

Section: The Welfare Economic Versus the Institutional Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

Environmental taxes and politics—the dispute over nitrogen taxes in agriculture

et al. 2002

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From the late 1980s we observe an increased interest in environmental taxes. Still, such taxes do not seem to be much used. The present paper offers some explanations for this. Its empirical basis is a debate over nitrogen fertilizer taxes in Norway. The study illustrates the difficulties involved when introducing the logic of economic efficiency into environmental policy. The problems seem to be an effect of the complexity of environmental issues, the character of the interests involved and the way decisions are instituted. Thus, we found disagreement across disciplines about the effects of a tax. In turn, this influenced the policy‐making process. Furthermore, we found that the way in which the decision‐making process was instituted and costs of taxing were distributed among agents distinctively influenced outcomes. Finally, our study demonstrates the vulnerability of environmental policy to confrontations across sectors of responsibility and how it is exposed to lack of institutionalized continuity. Our advice to experts working with policy instruments is to engage more deeply in understanding the institutional and distributional issues as they appear in specific cases. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.

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Neoclassical politics: public choice and political understanding

Cited by 14 publications

References 39 publications

Public choice, institutional economics, environmental goods

Public choice, institutional economics, environmental goods

Preferences, Virtues, and Institutions

Environmental taxes and politics—the dispute over nitrogen taxes in agriculture

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