Network compatibility, intensity of competition and process R&amp;D: A generalization

Shrivastav, Sumit

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.12.003

Mathematical Social Sciences

2021

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.12.003

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Network compatibility, intensity of competition and process R&D: A generalization

Sumit Shrivastav

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Cited by 11 publications

References 25 publications

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Strategic product compatibility in network industries

Buccella,

Fanti,

Gori

2023

J Econ

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This article considers a product’s compatibility as a strategic variable in a Cournot duopoly with network consumption externalities. It develops a non-cooperative compatibility decision game (CDG) in which firms choose whether to let products be (in)compatible. With costless compatibility, the unique (Pareto-efficient) sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the CDG is universal compatibility. With quasi-fixed compatibility costs, the SPNE depends on whether product compatibility is an endogenous (i.e., a profit-maximising) or exogenous (i.e., given by technical constraints) variable. In the case of endogenous compatibility, the SPNE can vary from one unique to multiple regimes of (in)compatibility, such as the anti-prisoner’s dilemma (deadlock), prisoner’s dilemma, and coordination game. In the case of exogenous compatibility, the SPNE can become an anti-coordination game as well. The article also discusses the welfare outcomes corresponding to the SPNE.

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Strategic product compatibility in network industries

Buccella,

Fanti,

Gori

2023

J Econ

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Corporate social responsibility and network externalities: a game-theoretic approach

Buccella,

Fanti,

Gori

et al. 2023

Ann Oper Res

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This research revisits the pioneering work by Katz and Shapiro (Am Econom Rev 75:424–440, 1985) with network (consumption) externalities in a twofold way: first, it considers Corporate Socially Responsible (CSR), instead of profit-maximising, firms; second, it uses a game-theoretic approach and analyses the commitment decision game in which firms face the binary choice to credibly commit ($$C$$ C ) or not to commit ($$NC$$ NC ) themselves to an announced output level in the first decision-making stage. Competition at the market stage occurs à la Cournot. Results show a rich spectrum of sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcomes, ranging from the prisoner’s dilemma (self-interest and mutual benefit of output commitment conflict) to the anti-prisoner’s dilemma or deadlock (self-interest and mutual benefit of output commitment do not conflict), passing from the coordination to the anti-coordination game. These outcomes depend on the intensity of the social concern in the firm’s objective and the network size. The article also pinpoints the welfare outcomes corresponding to the SPNE and extends the analysis to a Stackelberg rivalry setting.

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Network externalities, consumer heterogeneity, and optimal monopoly pricing

Shrivastav

2024

Mark Lett

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Network compatibility, intensity of competition and process R&D: A generalization

Cited by 11 publications

References 25 publications

Strategic product compatibility in network industries

Strategic product compatibility in network industries

Corporate social responsibility and network externalities: a game-theoretic approach

Network externalities, consumer heterogeneity, and optimal monopoly pricing

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