2010
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2010.06.005
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Network effects, network structure and consumer interaction in mobile telecommunications in Europe and Asia

Abstract: This paper estimates the importance of (tariff-mediated) network effects and the impact of a consumer"s social network on her choice of mobile phone provider. The study uses network data obtained from surveys of students in several European and Asian countries. We use the Quadratic Assignment Procedure, a non-parametric permutation test, to adjust for the particular error structure of network data. We find that respondents strongly coordinate their choice of mobile phone providers, but only if their provider i… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1

Citation Types

1
25
0

Year Published

2010
2010
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
7
2

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 37 publications
(26 citation statements)
references
References 18 publications
1
25
0
Order By: Relevance
“…In the extension of their earlier study, Birke and Swann (2010) confirm that the respondents coordinate choice of mobile carrier. They also identify the presence of social networks in carrier selection.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 57%
“…In the extension of their earlier study, Birke and Swann (2010) confirm that the respondents coordinate choice of mobile carrier. They also identify the presence of social networks in carrier selection.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 57%
“…The idea is that subscribers" utility is not equally increased by every new subscriber joining the network, but rather by the decisions of a small subset like friends and family, also known as "calling clubs" (Birke and Swann, 2010;Corrocher and Zirulia, 2009;Gabrielsen and Vagstad, 2008). This might make on-net discounts less attractive for large operators than in a situation with global network effects because consumers in the same calling club tend to cluster on networks in any case, so high on-net discounts of large operators would not deter entry by small operators.…”
Section: Tariff-mediated Network Effectsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indeed, when both parties to a call receive benefits from it, setting access charges equal to the cost of completing a call is typically inefficient, and bill-and-keep, by imposing some of the cost of a call on each network, is more efficient than cost-based termination charges. 14 And as we note in Section 3 below, bill-and-keep can be more efficient than cost-based Recent empirical evidence (e.g. Swann 2006, 2007) confirms that tariff-mediated network effects play an important role in mobile telecommunications, and that inducing network effects via off-net/on-net price differentials has been a successful strategy for incumbent mobile operators in Europe.…”
mentioning
confidence: 93%
“…101-115; and Armstrong and Wright 2007, pp. [13][14]. The characterization of mobile call termination as a "monopoly" assumes that mobile operators can make "take-it-or-leave-it" offers to fixed-line operators and to each other, which is typically justified by reference to various interconnectivity obligations.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%