2019
DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2019.05.009
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Network tariff design with prosumers and electromobility: Who wins, who loses?

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Cited by 64 publications
(24 citation statements)
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“…In [18], a game-theoretical model is employed for designing at tari s which aim at recovering sunk exogenous network costs. In [19], [20] the authors expand their analysis to a full bilevel model where the decision-making problem of a regulatory authority is expressed by the upper level and aims at recovering network costs (sunk costs in [20] and prospective costs in [19]). In [19], prospective network costs are expressed as a simple linear function of the overall peak power of the network.…”
Section: B Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In [18], a game-theoretical model is employed for designing at tari s which aim at recovering sunk exogenous network costs. In [19], [20] the authors expand their analysis to a full bilevel model where the decision-making problem of a regulatory authority is expressed by the upper level and aims at recovering network costs (sunk costs in [20] and prospective costs in [19]). In [19], prospective network costs are expressed as a simple linear function of the overall peak power of the network.…”
Section: B Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Kufeolu and Pollitt (2019) show the counterbalancing effect of EVs over the tariff increase caused by PVs under the current energy-based rate in Great-Britain. If batteries are added to the DER mix, Hoarau and Perez (2019) show that EVs and DERs may conflict under the main tariffs based on energy-based and capacity-based schemes by inducing negative spillovers on each other through the recovery of grid costs. A change of regulation would make winners and losers, so regulators should be careful about which kind of technology they want to promote 6 .…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The model is set up as a stylized game with two levels: an upperlevel cost recovery constraint; and a lower-level optimization problems. Using a similar mathematical formulation, specific aspects of the network tariff design problem in the European context have been studied in, for example, Govaerts et al (2019), Hoarau and Perez (2019), Schittekatte and Meeus (2020), Nouicer et al (2020) and Askeland et al (2020).…”
Section: Modelling Approachmentioning
confidence: 99%