Networked Authoritarianism and the Geopolitics of Information: Understanding Russian Internet Policy

Abstract

In the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. election, researchers, policymakers and the general public are grappling with the notion that the 45th president of the United States may very well owe his electoral victory to a sophisticated propaganda effort masterminded by the Kremlin. This article synthesizes existing research on Russia's domestic information controls, its internet policy at the global level (notably via internet governance processes), and the country's resurgence as a major geopolitical player to argue that policymakers as well as the general public should consider these themes holistically, particularly as they formulate responses to what many see as the Russian threat to Western liberal democracy. Russia may have lost the Cold War, but it is now waging information warfare against the liberal democracies of Europe and North America in a sophisticated bid to win the next round. Russia does not view internet governance, cybersecurity, and media policy as separate domains. Rather, all the areas covered by those disciplines fall under "information security" for Russian foreign policy. The paper begins by tracing the history of information controls within what is now the Russian Federation before discussing the role of information and internet policy in Russian foreign policy, drawing connections between the Russian government's control and manipulation of information-including its internet policy-in the domestic and international arenas. Next, it discusses the spread of networked authoritarianism and suggests that a "geopolitics of information" will become increasingly necessary in the coming years. Just as networked authoritarianism establishes strategic infrastructures to control the message domestically and intervene in global media systems, liberal democracies need to rethink media and communication infrastructures to ensure they foster pluralist, rights-respecting societies that are resilient to authoritarianism and extremism. In doing so, they should resist the temptation to respond to this threat in ways that will erode democracy even further, such as expanded surveillance and limits on free expression.

Social Media, Political Polarization, and Political Disinformation: A Review of the Scientific Literature

“…The fragmentation of the current media landscape makes Western channels vulnerable to unwittingly amplifying narratives pushed by state-run media outlets like Russia Today. This facilitates authoritarian regimes' manipulation of the perception of key issues by making it more difficult to distinguish between authentic and false information (Diamond et al 2016;Maréchal 2017;Richey 2017).…”

“…14 Studies of the Russian government's current disinformation strategy are largely qualitative. They often situate Russia's modern strategy within the Soviet-era practice of dezinformatsiya (disinformation), or planting false or distorted stories to influence Western public opinion(Ziegler 2017;Maréchal 2017). In recent years, Russia, China, Iran, and Venezuela have all used various disinformation strategies-successfully and unsuccessfully-to counter Western democracy promotion and to promote authoritarian interests abroad(Vanderhill 2013;Way 2015;Nocetti 2015; Lankina & Watanabe 2018).…”

Law and Digitization in Russia

“…The Russian government has tightened its control and supervision of cyberspace significantly in the last decade. The academic literature often sees this process in the context of containing opposition and political protest (Maréchal 2017;Ramesh et al 2020). However, at the same time cyberspace faces challenges on its own and provides new opportunities for criminal or civil misbehavior, including the following: spreading of computer worms, viruses, bots, as well as other malware and spyware; illicitly accessing computers; exceeding authorized access; trafficking in information; enabling or facilitating unauthorized activities in cyberspace; and using information, communications systems, and networks to embezzle, commit fraud, stalk and harass, or invade the privacy of others (Ryan et al 2011).…”

The Digital Transformation of the Public Sphere, Its Features in the Context of Various Political Regimes, and Its Possible Influence on Political Processes

“…Compared to the number of studies focusing on the digital transformation of the public sphere in democracies, there are significantly fewer studies devoted to non-democratic countries. These studies have been basically grouped around three main topics: 1) the role of the new ICT in organizing opposition protests (see, for instance, Lim, 2012;White, McAllister, 2014;Rød, Weidmann, 2015;Reuter, Szakonyi, 2015); 2) the use of the Internet and social media by authoritarian authorities for control over their countries (see, for instance, Mackinnon, 2011;Pearce, Kendzior, 2012;Hussain, Howard, 2014;Gunitsky, 2015;Han, 2015;King et al, 2017); and 3) attempts of authoritarian regimes to influence the politics in others countries (see, for instance, Aro, 2016;Maréchal, 2017;Tenove et al, 2018;Rid, 2016). In general, the digitalization of an APS has many common traits with a DPS (an increase in the multiplicity of forms of public discourse and ways to participate in it, an increase in civic activity, fragmentation, and hybridization), but it has also its own specifics connected with the state's active intervention in it, its attempts to take the online sphere under its control, or to use new technologies to strengthen its power (Morozov, 2011;Göbel, 2013).…”