2012
DOI: 10.22459/ngft.03.2012
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Networked Governance of Freedom and Tyranny: Peace in Timor-Leste

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Cited by 21 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…3. For a discussion on the scope of activities and extent of the clandestine movement's network, see Braithwaite, Charlesworth, and Soares (2012). 4.…”
Section: Notesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…3. For a discussion on the scope of activities and extent of the clandestine movement's network, see Braithwaite, Charlesworth, and Soares (2012). 4.…”
Section: Notesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition, all major political movements in Kosovo failed to hedge with the option of working with the nonviolent resistance to destabilize Milosevic inside Serbia. In East Timor at the same time, Fretilin was assuming a major leadership role in Jakarta in the nonviolent democracy movement to overthrow Indonesia's Suharto (Braithwaite et al 2012). There was only a tiny minority of Kosovo leaders, notably women, who advocated enhanced contacts with the Serbian opposition when hundreds of thousands of Serbs surged onto the streets of Belgrade to challenge Milosevic (Stephan 2006: 74).…”
Section: History Of Late 20th Century Nonviolent Resistancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…This sense of justice was also prominent in both the South African and the Timor-Leste Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) when they recommended that large corporations that benefited from apartheid or from the exploitation of Timor should pay some kind of special tax for the benefit of the victims of crimes against humanity. The world's first bilateral Truth Commission, between Indonesia and Timor-Leste, was fairly criticized for its many limitations (Braithwaite et al, 2012). Yet one of the interesting things it prioritized was the concept of institutional as opposed to individual responsibility, particularly of the armed forces and intelligence agencies of Indonesia, and a justice imperative for institutional transformation.…”
Section: Broadening Justicementioning
confidence: 99%