Neural correlates of automatic beliefs about gender and race

Knutson, Kristine M.; Mah, Linda; Manly, Charlotte F.; Grafman, Jordan

doi:10.1002/hbm.20320

Cited by 148 publications

(164 citation statements)

References 106 publications

(113 reference statements)

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“…Beauregard and Paquette (2006) reported that mystical experience in nuns activated several brain areas throughout the brain including the ventral medial frontal cortex and subcortical structures (Figure 1). Shortly later, it was found that the anteromedial prefrontal cortex was activated when subjects made implicit associations involving consistent gender and racial stereotypes (Knutson et al , 2007 ). Han et al (2008) showed that personal trait judgments regarding the self or public persons showed signifi cantly greater activity of the mid-dorsal medial frontal cortex in Christian than in non-religious subjects.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Schjoedt et al (2009) Personal prayer in religious subjects 8 20 50 Han et al (2008) Christian self-judgment 8 27 35 Sommer et al (2010) False belief attribution 4 34 40 Stern et al (2010) Greater uncertainty in sampling 6 33 30 Rothmayr et al (2011) Belief reasoning + inhibitory control 10 36 44 Beauregard and Paquette (2006) Mystical experience -11 52 13 Knutson et al (2007) Combined race and gender associations 20 51 9 Kapogiannis et al (2009) God ' s perceived involvement 9 66 6 Unauthenticated Download Date | 5/12/18 11:38 PM For the ' process of believing ' as it might appear in a religious or secular manner, we would like to coin the neologism ' credition ' . Credition is conceived as a psychological term in analogy to emotion and cognition that denotes the mental activity related to what we call ' he/she believes ' (Angel , 2006(Angel , , 2012.…”

Section: Theoretical Considerations Of Belief Processesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Processes of believing — a review and conceptual account

Seitz

Angel

2012

Reviews in the Neurosciences

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Processes of believing are thought to have an important impact on the control of human behavior. Recently, neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies have shown that believe processes involve brain areas known to be involved in emotion-related and cognitive processing. But there is a discrepancy between the increasing interest in empirical research and the lack of coherent terminology and conceptualization. We will show that in processes of believing, the medial frontal cortex plays a critical role within a widespread cortico-subcortical network owing to its role in valuation of internal and external events and in subjective control of action. Also, we will describe a model of processes of believing that integrates the divergent neurophysiological and conceptual aspects as a starting point for further interdisciplinary research questions.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theoretical Considerations Of Belief Processesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Processes of believing — a review and conceptual account

Seitz

Angel

2012

Reviews in the Neurosciences

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“…While both AI regions have been strongly implicated in self-processing, their role as a centre for interoceptive information processing means that they are also linked to the visceral representation of emotion and particularly negative affect (Nitschke, Sarinopoulos, MacKiewicz, Schaefer, & Davidson, 2006). Thus, it has been suggested that AI activation in prejudice studies represents the negative subjective feelings that participants experience when perceiving an out-group (Harris & Fiske, 2006;Knutson, Mah, Manly, & Grafman, 2007).…”

Section: Prejudice and The Conceptual Selfmentioning

confidence: 99%

Putting Ourselves in Another’s Skin: Using the Plasticity of Self-Perception to Enhance Empathy and Decrease Prejudice

Farmer

Maister

2017

Soc Just Res

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The self is one the most important concepts in social cognition and plays a crucial role in determining questions such as which social groups we view ourselves as belonging to and how we relate to others. In the past decade, the self has also become an important topic within cognitive neuroscience with an explosion in the number of studies seeking to understand how different aspects of the self are represented within the brain. In this paper, we first outline the recent research on the neurocognitive basis of the self and highlight a key distinction between two forms of self-representation. The first is the ''bodily'' self, which is thought to be the basis of subjective experience and is grounded in the processing of sensorimotor signals. The second is the ''conceptual'' self, which develops through our interactions of other and is formed of a rich network of associative and semantic information. We then investigate how both the bodily and conceptual self are related to social cognition with an emphasis on how self-representations are involved in the processing and creation of prejudice. We then highlight new research demonstrating that the bodily and conceptual self are both malleable and that this malleability can be harnessed in order to achieve a reduction in social prejudice. In particular, we will outline strong evidence that modulating people's perceptions of the bodily self can lead to changes in attitudes at the conceptual level. We will highlight a series of studies demonstrating that social attitudes towards various social out-groups (e.g. racial groups) can lead to a reduction in prejudice towards that group. Finally, we seek to place these findings in a broader social context by considering how innovations in virtual reality technology can allow experiences of taking on another's identity are likely to become both more commonplace and more convincing in the future and the various opportunities and risks associated with using such technology to reduce prejudice.

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“…In other words, automatic associations may not be expressed because of controlled processing. In order to address the problematic behavioral measurement of automatic aspects of attitudes, a small amount of neural research interested in the neural systems underlying prejudice has drawn on the Implicit Association Test (IAT: Greenwald et al, 1998) (Chee et al, 2000;Cunningham et al, 2004;Knutson et al, 2006;2007;Luo et al, 2006;Phelps et al, 2003;Phelps et al, 2000;Richeson et al, 2003). Although the IAT is one of the most popular behavioral measures of automatic (or implicit) attitudes, particularly for prejudice (Fazio and Olson, 2003), behavioral and modeling research suggests that IAT performance reflects both automatic and controlled processes (Conrey et al, 2005;Sherman et al, 2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%