Neural evidence for “intuitive prosecution”: The use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts

Young, Liane; Scholz, Jonathan; Saxe, Rebecca

doi:10.1080/17470919.2010.529712

Cited by 64 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 69 publications

(66 reference statements)

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“…We give some examples in Table 1. In total, we found 15 studies (reported in 14 publications) that relied on this type of contrast (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe and Wexler, 2005; Perner et al, 2006; Saxe and Powell, 2006; Saxe et al, 2006; Young et al, 2007, 2010, 2011; Kliemann et al, 2008; Mitchell, 2008; Aichhorn et al, 2009; Young and Saxe, 2009; Dodell-Feder et al, 2011; Lee et al, 2011). In the false belief story a short text passage is presented, which involves a person holding a false belief.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Common brain areas engaged in false belief reasoning and visual perspective taking: a meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies

Schurz

Aichhorn

Martin

et al. 2013

Front. Hum. Neurosci.

162

136

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We performed a quantitative meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies to identify brain areas which are commonly engaged in social and visuo-spatial perspective taking. Specifically, we compared brain activation for visual-perspective taking to activation for false belief reasoning, which requires awareness of perspective to understand someone's mistaken belief about the world which contrasts with reality. In support of a previous account by Perner and Leekam (2008), our meta-analytic conjunction analysis found common activation for false belief reasoning and visual perspective taking in the left but not the right dorsal temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). This fits with the idea that the left dorsal TPJ is responsible for representing different perspectives in a domain-general fashion. Moreover, our conjunction analysis found activation in the precuneus and the left middle occipital gyrus close to the putative Extrastriate Body Area (EBA). The precuneus is linked to mental-imagery which may aid in the construction of a different perspective. The EBA may be engaged due to imagined body-transformations when another's viewpoint is adopted.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Common brain areas engaged in false belief reasoning and visual perspective taking: a meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies

Schurz

Aichhorn

Martin

et al. 2013

Front. Hum. Neurosci.

162

136

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…With respect to the moral judgments, rTPJ has been demonstrated to be associated with encoding of other people’s beliefs, as well as with the use of those beliefs to achieve a moral judgment (Young and Saxe, 2009). Moreover, enhancement of rTPJ activation was associated more with negative moral judgments compared to positive judgments, suggesting that the participants engaged in mental state reasoning more robustly when confronted with immoral behaviors (Young et al , 2011). In line with our interpretation that rTPJ is involved in the automatic detection and evaluation of morally salient information, it has been suggested that the enhanced activation in rTPJ reflected greater attention to or deeper processing of mental state information especially when it supports a negative moral judgment, indicating neural evidence for ‘intuitive prosecution’ (Young et al , 2011).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, enhancement of rTPJ activation was associated more with negative moral judgments compared to positive judgments, suggesting that the participants engaged in mental state reasoning more robustly when confronted with immoral behaviors (Young et al , 2011). In line with our interpretation that rTPJ is involved in the automatic detection and evaluation of morally salient information, it has been suggested that the enhanced activation in rTPJ reflected greater attention to or deeper processing of mental state information especially when it supports a negative moral judgment, indicating neural evidence for ‘intuitive prosecution’ (Young et al , 2011). Further, salience brain regions were coactive with frontal and default network brain regions later in the post-decision epoch, suggesting that this detection of moral salience engaged downstream control resources, particularly for judgments involving immoral content.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Salience network engagement with the detection of morally laden information

Sevinc

Gürvıt

Spreng

2017

Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience

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Moral cognition is associated with activation of the default network, regions implicated in mentalizing about one’s own actions or the intentions of others. Yet little is known about the initial detection of moral information. We examined the neural correlates of moral processing during a narrative completion task, which included an implicit moral salience manipulation. During fMRI scanning, participants read a brief vignette and selected the most semantically congruent sentence from two options to complete the narrative. The options were immoral, moral or neutral statements. RT was fastest for the selection of neutral statements and slowest for immoral statements. Neuroimaging analyses revealed that responses involving morally laden content engaged default and executive control network brain regions including medial and rostral prefrontal cortex, and core regions of the salience network, including anterior insula and dorsal anterior cingulate. Immoral vs moral conditions additionally engaged the salience network. These results implicate the salience network in the detection of moral information, which may modulate downstream default and frontal control network interactions in the service of complex moral reasoning and decision-making processes. These findings suggest that moral cognition involves both bottom-up and top-down attentional processes, mediated by discrete large-scale brain networks and their interactions.

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“…To agree with subjective claims, it is assumed that participants must hold on to some mental state representation (either their own or others', see Saxe, 2009). Haxby, 2007;Ruby & Decety, 2003;Saxe & Kanwisher 2003;Saxe & Powell, 2006;Vogeley et al, 2001;Young et al, 2010;Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007;Young, Scholz & Saxe, 2011;Young & Saxe, 2008;2009). Some ToM ROIs, such as RTPJ, have been shown to play a critical role in moral judgment (Young et al, 2010;Young & Saxe, 2009); however, researchers have hypothesized that these regions are critical to processes underlying moral judgment (e.g.…”

Section: Metaethics and Mental State Representationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Examining overlap in behavioral and neural representations of morals, facts, and preferences.

Theriault¹,

Waytz²,

Heiphetz³

et al. 2017

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

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OVERLAP IN MORALS, FACTS, AND PREFERENCES 2Metaethical judgments refer to judgments about the information expressed by moral claims.Moral objectivists generally believe that moral claims are akin to facts, whereas moral subjectivists generally believe that moral claims are more akin to preferences. Evidence from developmental and social psychology has generally favored an objectivist view; however, this work has typically relied on few examples, and analyses have disallowed statistical generalizations beyond these few stimuli. The present work addresses whether morals are represented as fact-like or preference-like, using behavioral and neuroimaging methods, in combination with statistical techniques that can a) generalize beyond our sample stimuli, and b) test whether particular item features are associated with neural activity. Behaviorally, and contrary to prior work, morals were perceived as more preference-like than fact-like. Neurally, morals and preferences elicited common magnitudes and spatial patterns of activity, particularly within dorsal-medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), a critical region for social cognition. This common DMPFC activity for morals and preferences was present across whole-brain conjunctions, and in individually localized functional regions of interest (targeting the Theory of Mind network). By contrast, morals and facts did not elicit any neural activity in common.Follow-up item analyses suggested that the activity elicited in common by morals and preferences was explained by their shared tendency to evoke representations of mental states. We conclude that morals are represented as far more subjective than prior work has suggested. This conclusion is consistent with recent theoretical research, which has argued that morality is fundamentally about regulating social relationships.Keywords: metaethics, morality, social cognition, fMRI, theory of mind OVERLAP IN MORALS, FACTS, AND PREFERENCES 3Examining overlap in behavioral and neural representations of morals, facts, and preferences.Moral claims (e.g. "eating meat is wrong") can be evaluated on multiple levels. One may agree or disagree with a given claim (a first-order judgment); however, independent of this, one may make a second-order (i.e. metaethical) judgment-regardless of whether you agree or disagree, what information does the claim express? Moral objectivists generally believe that moral claims are either true or false, and that this truthfulness is independent of anyone's personal beliefs (i.e. moral claims are akin to facts). By contrast, moral subjectivists believe that personal beliefs govern whether moral claims are true-or that moral claims cannot be true or false at all (i.e. moral claims are akin to preferences; Sayre-McCord, 1986; for review, see Goodwin & Darley, 2010). Metaethical questions are the subject of intense philosophical debate, yet they are highly relevant to cognitive, social, and moral psychology. Metaethical questions ask how moral information is represented. It is possible that morals are represented...

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Neural evidence for “intuitive prosecution”: The use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts

Cited by 64 publications

References 69 publications

Common brain areas engaged in false belief reasoning and visual perspective taking: a meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies

Common brain areas engaged in false belief reasoning and visual perspective taking: a meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies

Salience network engagement with the detection of morally laden information

Examining overlap in behavioral and neural representations of morals, facts, and preferences.

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