Neural Network-Based Entropy: A New Metric for Evaluating Side-Channel Attacks

Abstract

Side-channel attacks (SCAs) are powerful noninvasive attacks that can be used for leaking the secret key of integrated circuits (ICs). Numerous countermeasures were proposed to elevate the security level of ICs against SCAs. Unfortunately, it is quite inconvenient to predict the security levels of these countermeasures since no solid mathematical model exists in the literature. In this paper, neural network (NN)-based entropy is proposed to model the resilience of a system against SCAs. The NN-based entropy model well links the side-channel leakages and probabilities with the neurons and weights of NNs, respectively. In such a circumstance, the NN-based entropy can be used for modeling the robustness of countermeasures since a one-to-one relationship is established between the NN-based entropy and the measurement-to-disclose (MTD) enhancement ratio related with the countermeasures. As demonstrated in the result, the proposed NN-based entropy metric shows 100% consistency with the MTD enhancement ratio if multiple SCA countermeasures are employed into a system.

A novel SM4 cryptographic architecture against higher order power analysis attacks

“…[1][2][3] The major mechanism of side-channel attacks for leaking the secret information is exploring the correlation between the processed data and corresponding physical leakages (i.e., power dissipation, timing information, and electro-magnetic [EM] emission). 4,5 Accordingly, side-channel attacks can be categorized into power analysis attacks (PAAs), timing attacks, and EM attacks. [5][6][7][8] PAAs belong to popular side-channel attacks since the power dissipation of ICs can be acquired by attackers without much effort to execute the correlation analysis.…”

“…10 Secret merchant-4 (SM4) [11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20] and advanced encryption standard (AES) cryptographic algorithms 5,6 are a type of symmetric block ciphers that are able to achieve fast encryption speeds and low hardware implementation costs. 4,[21][22][23][24][25] Unfortunately, both SM4 and AES cryptographic algorithms are pretty vulnerable to PAAs when they are implemented in hardware levels. 4,26 So as to reinforce the security levels of SM4 and AES cryptographic circuits against PAAs, a variety of countermeasures [27][28][29] have been proposed to break the critical correlation between the processed data and monitored power dissipation.…”

“…4,[21][22][23][24][25] Unfortunately, both SM4 and AES cryptographic algorithms are pretty vulnerable to PAAs when they are implemented in hardware levels. 4,26 So as to reinforce the security levels of SM4 and AES cryptographic circuits against PAAs, a variety of countermeasures [27][28][29] have been proposed to break the critical correlation between the processed data and monitored power dissipation. However, most of these countermeasures are only efficient against first-order PAAs, the secret information still can be exposed when higher order PAAs are performed on these countermeasures.…”

“…Non‐invasive hardware attacks such as side‐channel attacks cause severe threatens to modern integrated circuits (ICs) 1–3 . The major mechanism of side‐channel attacks for leaking the secret information is exploring the correlation between the processed data and corresponding physical leakages (i.e., power dissipation, timing information, and electro‐magnetic [EM] emission) 4,5 . Accordingly, side‐channel attacks can be categorized into power analysis attacks (PAAs), timing attacks, and EM attacks 5–8 .…”

A high‐speed and low‐latency hardware implementation of RC4 cryptographic algorithm

“…In addition to performance optimization, 22 security against hardware attacks is also of paramount importance to the RC4 design. 14,23,24 Differential power analysis (DPA) attacks 11,25,26 are a kind of efficient hardware attacks that may be explored by attackers to disclose the secret key of RC4 cryptographic algorithm. Only by analyzing the correlation between the input data and dynamic power dissipation of an unprotected cryptographic circuit under DPA attacks, the internal secret key is likely to be leaked without much effort.…”