Neural representations unobserved—or: a dilemma for the cognitive neuroscience revolution

Abstract

Neural structural representations are cerebral map-or model-like structures that structurally resemble what they represent. These representations are absolutely central to the "cognitive neuroscience revolution", as they are the only type of representation compatible with the revolutionaries' mechanistic commitments. Crucially, however, these very same commitments entail that structural representations can be observed in the swirl of neuronal activity. Here, I argue that no structural representations have been observed being present in our neuronal activity, no matter the spatiotemporal scale of observation. My argument begins by introducing the "cognitive neuroscience revolution" ( §1) and sketching a prominent, widely adopted account of structural representations ( §2). Then, I will consult various reports that describe our neuronal activity at various spatiotemporal scales, arguing that none of them reports the presence of structural representations ( §3). After having de ected certain intuitive objections to my analysis ( §4), I will conclude that, in the absence of neural structural representations, representationalism and mechanism can't go together, and so the "cognitive neuroscience revolution" is forced to abandon one of its main commitments ( §5).