J. R. Gray (2002) questioned the conceptual basis and empirical support for prosocial biological affects and was skeptical whether the distinction between selfish versus prosocial biological affects can contribute to the discussion regarding hemispheric differences. In reply, hemispheric differences in emotional experience and expression are considered, with the suggestion that the individualist-prosocial distinction may indeed provide a useful addition to traditional higher-level cognitive approaches. Recent empirical evidence relating to prosocial biological affects and emotions is reviewed, and the conceptual basis for prosocial biological affects and emotions is expanded on, with particular reference to answering "selfish gene" conceptualizations. Related genes can exist in different individual organisms, forming the basis for an essential and authentic prosociality: genuine altruism or "true love." Jeremy R. Gray (2002) has reviewed my developmentalinteractionist theory of affect (Buck, 1999) and has raised interesting and important questions and concerns. Gray questioned the conceptual basis and empirical support for the notion of prosocial biological affects, and he was skeptical whether the distinction between individualist or, colloquially, "selfish" affects and prosocial or "cooperative" affects can contribute to the discussion regarding hemispheric differences. The distinction between prosocial and selfish affects is based on Paul D. MacLean's (1990MacLean's ( , 1993 theory, which distinguished emotions concerned with selfpreservation, such as aggression and fear, and emotions concerned with the preservation of the species, such as sex and sociability. MacLean argued that the former involves amygdala circuits, and the latter, septal and thalamo-cingulate circuits. The prosocialselfish distinction is fundamental to my approach, which identifies subjectively experienced affect with specific neurochemical systems. Indeed, prosocial affects demonstrate some of the clearest relationships between emotions and specific neurochemicals. Also, this distinction distinguishes developmental-interactionist theory from many recent emotion theories, which often overlook or implicitly or explicitly deny that sex, bonding, and attachment are emotions. The proposition that selfish affects are particularly associated with the right hemisphere (RH) and prosocial affects with the left hemisphere (LH) is not central to my theory, but it is a hypothesis that if supported would constitute important evidence for its validity and usefulness. My reply first considers Gray's central argument that a prosocial-selfish distinction is not necessary to account for hemispheric differences in affect, and I then address the more general issue of prosocial biological affects.