Neurointerventions, Morality, and Children

Abstract

Is the political community morally permitted to use neurointerventions to improve the moral conduct of children? Putting aside difficult questions concerning the institutionalization of moral enhancement, the authors address this question, first, by arguing that is not, in itself, always morally impermissible for the community to impose neurointerventions on adults. Although certain ideals, such as the ideal of individual autonomy, limit the permissible employment of neurointerventions, they do not generate a moral constraint that always forbids their use. Thereafter, they argue that because young children lack certain moral capacities that adults possess, the moral limits that pertain to the use of neurointerventions to improve their moral behaviour are, in principle, less restrictive than they are for adults.

In defence of ‘Toma’: Algorithmic enhancement of a sense of justice

“…It filters information, and it induces or forestalls emotional responses by regulating various features of the environment or Diana's physiology that impact on her attitudes and decision-making. In this, it is akin to 'bioenhancement': the introduction of chemicals -such as serotonin -into the brain, or the control of nutrition, sleep, exercise, and stressors that directly alter the beliefs and desires of individuals (see Persson and Savulescu 2012;Sparrow 2014;Baccarini 2014;Savalescu and Maslen 2015;Clayton and Moles 2018). Toma also alters Diana's interests to bring them into harmony with societal and third party interests.…”

“…Yet, this seems intuitively implausible. If it were not, then it would commit us to saying there is no difference between Diana coming to act upon reasons that she finds, upon reflection, to be sufficiently weighty to motivate her actions, and acting merely as a result of some unseen external, but benign, force (Clayton and Moles 2018). But, there does seem a difference between Diana rejecting a meat option because she weighs the animal suffering involved as an overwhelming reason not to take a bite, and a feeling of nausea induced by an electric current triggered by her smartwatch.…”

Further Thoughts on Talking to the Unreasonable: A Response to Wong

“…Persuading individuals to bring their comprehensive convictions into line with liberal principles is generally preferable to other forms of belief formation or manipulation of people's behaviour. Of course, it is possible to alter the payoffs of the various options available to someone (either by threats or incentives) such that, given her beliefs, she is led to behave differently; it is possible to 'nudge' people towards the right views or conduct by altering certain features of the choice architecture to shape their beliefs or behaviour; it may even become possible to change beliefs via direct neurointerventions into the brain (Clayton and Moles 2018). However, other things equal, persuasion is generally preferable to these other kinds of intervention because it leaves the individual free to come to see for herself that there are weighty reasons to endorse and live by liberal values.…”