Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract This paper contributes to the ongoing methodological debate on context-free versus in-context presentation of experimental tasks. We report an experiment using the paradigm of a bribery experiment. In one condition, the task is presented in a typical bribery context, the other one uses abstract wording. Though the underlying context is heavily loaded with negative ethical preconceptions, we do not find significant differences. We conjecture that the experimental design transmits the essential features of a bribery situation already with neutral framing, such that the presentation does not add substantially to subjects' interpretation of the task. Terms of use: Documents in KeywordsCorruption, context, framing, valence, experimental instructions, laboratory, trust, reciprocity, ethical behaviour, social norms JEL Classification CodesC91, D62, D72, D73, K42 AcknowledgementsThe authors thank Heiko Schmidt for valuable research assistance, Bernd Irlenbusch, Elke Renner, Reinhard Selten, and seminar participants in Amsterdam, Wittenberg and Strasbourg for helpful comments and suggestions. All errors remain our own. Financial support by the European Union through the TMR research network EN-DEAR (FMRX-CT98-0238) is gratefully acknowledged.

Letting the Briber Go Free: An Experiment on Mitigating Harassment Bribes

“…4 He hypothesizes that offering the citizen legal impunity for whistle-blowing even if she has paid a bribe can encourage more frequent reporting. In turn, this should discourage officials from demanding bribes in 3 "Rs.…”

“…For example, about 44% of parents in several African countries were asked to pay bribes for admission to public schools for their children, (Transparency International, 2010). 4 A citizen feedback model being trailed in Pakistan (Callen and Hasanain, 2011) and Ghana's whistleblower act (Amegashie, 2013) have some similar features, with protection being granted to citizen whistleblowers and measures taken to empower them by registering their complaints.…”

Smiley or Frowney: The Effect of Emotions and Empathy Framing in a Downstream Water Pollution Game

“…In bribing games, Abbink & Hennig-Schmidt (2006) showed that there is no difference between individual behavior exposed to neutral and framed/contextualized instructions, while Barr & Serra (2009) reported the opposite finding. In public goods games, Cookson (2000) found that changing the presentational variables (e.g.…”

“…However, in certain contexts it is impossible to avoid framing without making the task irrelevant. A number of studies examine the effect of framing in the instructions on individual behavior in the context of corruption (Abbink & Hennig-Schmidt, 2006;Barr & Serra, 2009), public goods games (Andreoni, 1995;Cookson, 2000;Park, 2000;Fujimoto & Park, 2010;, sequential bargaining games (Brosig et al, 2003), and altruistic giving in dictator games (Duffy & Kornienko 2010). The existing experiments manipulating the framing of instructions can be separated roughly into two categories: procedural-oriented framing (which compares the different ways of representing the problem, e.g.…”

Condemning corruption while condoning inefficiency: an experimental investigation into voting behavior

“…Experiments that investigate corrupt decisions randomly allocate subjects to the role of the briber and of the public official, and allow subjects to decide whether to offer a bribe and to accept it, respectively (Abbink et al 2000(Abbink et al , 2002(Abbink et al , 2014Abbink 2004;Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt 2006;Abbink and Wu 2017). We do not allocate subjects randomly to the different roles for ethical and experimental reasons.…”