“…Indeed, any attempt to build on the merits of both I/O and RBV must account for the varying degrees of infl uence of both industry factors and fi rm resources on performance (Claver-Cortes et al, 2004;Roquebert et al, 1996;Spanos et al, 2004). A renewed interest in organizational economics emerged in the 2000s, including issues such as incentives, agency theory, transaction cost theory, authority and delegation, decentralization, and property rights theory, has built upon both I/O and the RBV (Fulghieri and Hodrick, 2006;Foss and Foss, 2005;Kim and Mahoney, 2005;Sheehan and Foss, 2007;Tywoniak et al, 2007;Whinston, 2003).…”