n i v e r s i t y o f M a s s a c h u s e t t s -B o s t o nT he influence of community dynamics on offending has long been a focus of criminological research. Likewise, changing these community dynamics is a popular focus of crime-fighting programs and policies. Community policing, neighborhood watches, anti-"stop snitching" campaigns, and similar programs attempt to foster resident involvement in crime fighting. These programs must contend with busy, disinterested, or fearful residents as well as the broader stereotypes and stigma attached to both high-crime neighborhoods and those who police them. Patrick Carr's (2005) new parochialism is a relatively recent theoretical development to understand how informal social control may play out in contemporary communities facing some of these challenges. Ramey and Shrider (2014, this issue) test the impact of the policy implications of new parochialism in their exploration of Seattle's Neighborhood Matching Fund (NMF) program.New parochialism is an extension of Albert Hunter's typology of informal social control (Hunter, 1985). Hunter first argued that individuals self-regulate behavior in their neighborhoods when private (family and friends), parochial (neighbors and neighborhood institutions), and public (city services based outside the neighborhood) levels of control work together. Carr found in his ethnographic study of Beltway in Chicago that residents engaged in successful informal social control even when the private, parochial, and public levels did not work together. Although private and parochial networks were diminished in Beltway, residents capitalized on control efforts that bridged parochial and public levels. In other words, even though residents did not intervene directly on the behavior of their I thank Andrew Papachristos for comments on an earlier draft of this essay. Direct correspondence to Andrea