Newtonian Idealism: Matter, Perception, and the Divine Will

Abstract

This paper investigates Isaac Newton's rather unique account of God's relation to matter. According to this account, corpuscles depend on a substantially omnipresent God endowing quantities of objective space with the qualities of shape, solidity, the unfaltering tendency to move in accord with certain laws, andsignificantly-the power to interact with created minds. I argue that there are important similarities and differences between Newton's account of matter and Berkeley's idealism. And while the role played by the divine will might at first appear to be a species of occasionalism, I conclude that there are, for Newton, genuine causal relations between minds and bodies. Ultimately, to fully appreciate this account of the creation and persistence of matter, we must consider not only Newton's metaphysical writings, but also his sensorium theory of mind-body interaction, his heterodox theological commitments, and the influences of Descartes, More, and Locke.The "ever-living agent, who being in all places, is more able by his will to move the bodies within his boundless uniform sensorium, and thereby to form and reform the parts of the universe, than we are by our will to move the parts of our own bodies." (Opticks, Query 31) 1In an undated manuscript on the gravity and equilibrium of solid bodies in fluids, Isaac Newton offers an account of corpuscular bodies in which God's will plays an essential role. My aim here is to explicate aspects of this account, relating it both to Newton's views on the nature of perception and his rather heterodox theological commitments. As I see it, Newton divides the created universe into two fundamental entities: "created" or "finite" minds and Liam P. Dempsey is an Assistant Professor at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario. He works in early modern philosophy and contemporary philosophy of mind, and has published articles in several journals including the

John Locke, ‘Hobbist’: of sleeping souls and thinking matter

“…I have argued elsewhere that, with respect to the mind-body relation, Newton defends a kind of substance monism, at least in one important sense of the word 'substance' (Dempsey 2006). I have also advanced the view that Newton's account of God's creation of bodies ('corpuscles') in his De gravitatione manuscript, 12 coupled with his sensorium account of perception alluded to in his Opticks and elsewhere, imply a sort of idealism (Dempsey 2014). Here I wish to emphasize the aspects of his view that are dualistic in nature, aspects that follow from his idiosyncratic idealism.…”

“…16. See also Tamny (1979); Gorham (2011); Dempsey (2014). Gorham interprets Newton’s views as being guided by a Cartesian conception of causation.…”