Nexmon

Schulz, Matthias; Wegemer, Daniel; Hollick, Matthias

doi:10.1145/3131473.3131476

Cited by 51 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 7 publications

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“…In fact, Schulz et al [32][33][34] have developed a smartphone APP to implement the Software-Defined Radio (SDR) function on smartphones. It supports various kinds of WiFi devices, which can be found in [31]. By using this APP, we can achieve the goal of adjusting CP length on commercial WiFi devices.…”

Section: Figure 7: Authorization Code Encoding/decodingmentioning

confidence: 99%

AuthCTC: Defending Against Waveform Emulation Attack in Heterogeneous IoT Environments

Zhang

Huang

et al. 2020

Proceedings of the 15th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security

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Widely deployed IoT devices have raised serious concerns for the spectrum shortage and the cost of multi-protocol gateway deployment. Recent emerging Cross-Technology Communication (CTC) technique can alleviate this issue by enabling direct communication among heterogeneous wireless devices, such as WiFi, Bluetooth, and ZigBee on 2.4 GHz. However, this new paradigm also brings security risks, where an attacker can use CTC to launch wireless attacks against IoT devices. Due to limited computational capability and different wireless protocols being used, many IoT devices are unable to use computationally-intensive cryptographic approaches for security enhancement. Therefore, without proper detection methods, IoT devices cannot distinguish signal sources before executing command signals. In this paper, we first demonstrate a new defined physical layer attack in the CTC scenario, named as waveform emulation attack, where a WiFi device can overhear and emulate the ZigBee waveform to attack ZigBee IoT devices. Then, to defend against this new attack, we propose a physical layer defensive mechanism, named as AuthCTC, to verify the legitimacy of CTC signals. Specifically, at the sender side, an authorization code is embedded into the packet preamble by leveraging the dynamically changed cyclic prefix. A WiFi-based detector is used to verify the authorization code at the receiver side. Extensive simulations and experiments using off-the-shelf devices are conducted to demonstrate both the feasibility of the attack and the effectiveness of our defensive mechanism. CCS CONCEPTS • Security and privacy → Authorization; • Networks → Mobile and wireless security.

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Section: Figure 7: Authorization Code Encoding/decodingmentioning

confidence: 99%